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ABSTRACT 
 
Economics is supposed to fall somewhere between a hard science and a social 
science.  During the last half century, economics has become highly mathematical 
trying to mimic physics.  The purpose of this study is to look at the metaphysical 
statements linked to mathematical models, specifically, Game Theory.  In doing so, it 
will be demonstrated that Game Theory, as part of neoclassical economics, engages in 
analysis which can be categorized as metaphysical, with real metaphysical 
implications.  In categorizing the metaphysical assumptions of neoclassical 
economists/game theorists we will see how much of their analysis is consists in a 
reductive, implausible metaphysical view.  Problems that arise from this view are 
hardly taken into consideration most economists.  This lack of consideration has non-
trivial consequences for economics as a discipline and for its methodology.   
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1. Introduction  
 
 The present study of economics has become increasingly reliant on extensive 
use of mathematics.  This use of mathematics in economics requires one to forgo the 
otherwise rigorous analysis that one requires when using philosophy, and its relation 
to other disciplines, in particular, economics.  Economists tend to overlook some 
statements that can be deemed philosophical.  The purpose of this study is to capture 
some of the “philosophical presuppositions” in economics that might affect its 
theoretical coherence.  Economic ontology (the study of beings as they relate to the 
economy and their behavior in the world) are increasingly becoming areas of inquiry 
in relation to economic theory.1  Economic Ontology seeks to uncover those 
“philosophical [ontological] presuppositions” that lie at the bottom of economic 
theory.2  Uskali Mäki cites the Duhem-Quine thesis as an example of how 
mathematics and the use of empirical methods might affect the conclusions by 
economists and scientists.  The Duhem-Quine thesis states that scientific theories are 
not able to be “proven” based on the results from empirical testing.3  Thus, Mäki 
states, the results from empirical testing are not able to discriminate among 
competing theories—that is, results are not able to establish the merits, or demerits of 
a certain scientific (and economic) theory.4    The purpose of philosophical 
considerations is not only to question the foundations on which mainstream economic 
                                                 
1
 The Economic World View, Studies in the Ontology of Economics presents a series of essays that deal 
with some of the main issues (or philosophical presuppositions) in various areas of economics. 
 
2
 See Uskali Mäki, “The what, why, and how of Economic Ontology,” pg. 10. 
 
3
 See Ibid. pg. 9 
 
4
 Ibid. pg. 9 
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analysis is done, but also to better our understanding of the world.  This paper argues 
that the mere use of mathematics is not sufficient as a justification of economic 
arguments.5   
 The need to look outside economic analysis is imperative to have a more 
sound economic view of the world.  Some practicing economists/applied 
mathematicians state that they do not make “metaphysical” statements without 
realizing that mathematics, as well as natural science is founded on certain 
“metaphysical” statements.  Martin Heidegger’s essay “Modern Science, 
Metaphysics, and Mathematics” states precisely how the history of science is founded 
upon seemingly “evident” truths that Isaac Newton inherits from philosophers going 
back to Aristotle and other Greeks.6  Metaphysics, that which is beyond the physical 
(constituted of space and time) is inherently present in the study of motion; it is 
arguably the case that thought/thinking are also metaphysical “things.”  The different 
stages of history will affect theories of motion (that of Aristotle, or that of Newton).  
Heidegger’s analysis of the “mathematical” starts by presenting the etymology of the 
word mathematics.  Mathematics, he states, has to do with “number,” but this is an 
inherently narrow definition of the mathematical.  Ta mathēmata, that which can be 
learned, and mathēsis—that which can be taught, is at the foundation of 
“mathematics.”  What can be learned and what can be taught, for Heidegger, is a 
                                                 
5
 Mäki suggests that it is indeed to uncover the limitations of scientific/economic theories that lead us 
to a more coherent view of the world—only after we have discovered such limitations we can “justify” 
the merits of any given theory (pg. 10). 
 
6
 See Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics,” pp. 281-288.   
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philosophical problem which deals in deciphering the “thingness of things.”7  What is 
it about mathematics that helps us decipher the “thingness of things.”  When we 
answer the question about numbers, and their relation to the “thingness of things,” it 
is possible, according to Heidegger, to do the learning.  The number 3, he states, is a 
seemingly simple concept already at hand for us to analyze.  When we see three 
chairs, he states, we immediately see the number three.  Conversely, when we try to 
grasp the concept of “threeness,” we are left to referring to the natural series of 
natural numbers.8  What Heidegger points out using this example is that there are two 
senses of the “mathematical.”  The first sense of the mathematical is that which is 
learnable and comes naturally from observation.  But the second sense of the 
“mathematical” is  
the manner of learning and the process itself[;] [t]he mathematical is that 
evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and 
according to which we experience them as things at all, and as such things.  
The mathematical is this fundamental position we take toward things by 
which we take up things as already given to us, and as they must and should 
be given.  The mathematical is thus the fundamental presupposition of the 
knowledge of things.9 
                                                 
 
7
 Ibid. pg. 274, This seemingly odd formulation has to do with the world as we encounter it.  The 
philosopher’s task is to try to decipher the world.  Heidegger cites five different areas in connection 
with ta mathēmata: 
1) Ta physica: things insofar as they originate and come forth from themselves 
2) Ta poioumena: things insofar as they are produced by humans and exist as such 
3) Ta chrēmata: things insofar as they are in use or subsist at our disposal—these might be any 
object relating to ta physica or ta poioumena such as rocks, or in the case of poioumena, 
anything we might make 
4) Ta pragmata: things insofar as we encounter them at all, whether we use them, work on them, 
transform them. 
5) Ta mathēmata: what can be learned insofar as 1-4. 
 
8
 Ibid. pg. 277 
 
9
 Ibid. pp. 277-278, Heidegger cites the sign at the entrance of Plato’s academy stating: “Let no one 
enter who has not grasped the meaning of the mathematical.”  This reference relates clearly to the 
conception of the mathematical strictly relating to number and the need to go beyond this 
understanding. 
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If we take Heidegger’s formulation of the mathematical, we see clearly that the 
mathematical itself is not a simple set of numerical relations.  What does the 
“knowledge of things” entail?  Heidegger points out that the project of the 
mathematical (conceptualized in the manner of that which goes beyond number), is to 
project things as they first show themselves (as in the example of 3 chairs being just 
there).  The project of the mathematical is axiomatic—that is the mathematical 
project sets out to make statements about the world from fundamental propositions.  
These fundamental propositions are set out in advance in order for the experimenter 
to have access to this (mathematical) axiomatic project.10  This is the mathematical 
system developed by Newtonian mechanics (relating to the motion of bodies), or the 
infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz.  The relations of objects are analyzed by a closed 
system that is coherent and is developed from axioms.  “Knowledge of things” in the 
case of Newtonian mechanics, or infinitesimal calculus, attempts to give rise to 
knowledge of things generally; but in both cases, according to Heidegger, we have 
the “narrow” sense of mathematics at work.11  Heidegger states that the ‘calculation’ 
which is the result from the mathematical formalism and intuitive determination of 
things has given modern science (economics is mentioned only in passing) its status 
of stature.  In reality, the “burning questions” about things, and specifically beings 
remain unanswered and unquestioned.12  If we are to dig deep into the foundations of 
                                                 
 
10Ibid. pp. 291-292  
 
11
 Ibid. pg. 297 
 
12Ibid. pg. 296  
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mathematics and its relation to other sciences, it is only through metaphysics that this 
can be done—this is so because metaphysics reaches farthest not only to beings or 
things, but to beings in totality.13         
 What exactly does metaphysics mean to economics?  The way in which 
economists construe agents and economic structures will have implications as to what 
predictions will come from within the specific economic presuppositions.  This 
applies not only for economists, but also other social scientists that make statements 
about complex human reality.  From this complex human reality, it follows that the 
structures in which humans exist are also complex and have an impact on how 
scientists and economists do science.  Sections 2-3 state that mathematics could be 
the foundation of economic analysis, but it is only through an inherently metaphysical 
analysis that allows us to posit this mathematical foundation.  Section 4 on economic 
methodology tries to show the lack of progression in the mainstream economics with 
regards to methodological issues that affect economic analysis.  Section 5 deals with 
the current view of mainstream economics which involves rigorous “mathematical 
formulations,” but its assumptions about individuals in an economy is far from 
economic reality.  Section 6 challenges mainstream economic theory with respect to 
value among other things.  This whole of this study involves a truly interdisciplinary 
approach utilizing psychology, economics, philosophy and history.  Thus, the study 
of economics is not merely the study of “economic agents” all of whom can be 
reduced to mathematical algorithms (determined and deterministic calculations).  
Economics is not only about making tractable formulations, abstracted from any type 
                                                 
 
13
 Ibid. pg. 296 
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of worldly reality.  Knowing how these formulations come to be will help us 
understand the how radical our conclusions might be in relation to history, science, 
philosophy and the development of knowledge (and the lack of it). 
2. Kant and the Possibility for a Science  
 
 Kant’s genius allowed him to ponder the question whether philosophy could 
ground itself like a science in order for knowledge to be possible.  Kant’s idea for 
philosophy does not rely on a form of metaphysics from which all positings are 
derived.  Mathematics, for example, seems to be an important case for the 
philosopher of science to ponder in order to dismantle the metaphysics that go with 
the grounding that is given to some metaphysical forms of mathematics.  
Mathematics is possible formulated as idealism.  That is, mathematical objects exist 
outside of the mind, and therefore they are independent of human positing for 
existence.  Plato is the main influence in the history of philosophy to bring forth such 
a foundation to philosophical thought.  And although Plato’s view provided a great 
deal of insight on philosophical questions, it allows for a metaphysics which posits 
objects outside of the realm of experience; something which ultimately is (according 
to Kant) ‘spurious metaphysics.’  According to Kant, time & space are ‘pure 
sensibilities’ which must ground logic.  That is, it is impossible to come to a 
conclusive positing about objects outside of space & time.  For systems of 
mathematics, what follows from this is that mathematical objects viewed as 
independent entities become another form of spurious metaphysics.  Kant’s insight 
about the way in which we ground our epistemology will impact the type of 
philosophy and science (including mathematics and natural science).  If we want to 
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steer away from spurious metaphysics, Kant’s epistemology must be carefully 
examined against other forms of idealism, and this, will be the ground for philosophy, 
and ultimately other sciences.    
In order to posit the existence of something, first, that object must lie within 
space & time.  Plato’s strong disagreement against Kant lies in the fact that, if we 
posit objects inside of space & time, we will not really ground anything because of 
the unreliability of the senses, from which we experience objects.  Thus the great 
disagreement between Plato and Kant is about the senses.  Plato requires positing 
objects outside of space & time in order to make these objects unchanging.  Thus, 
Plato would view Kant’s “psychologism” as unreliable because Plato views the 
senses as an unreliable mechanism through which we can come to “know” things.14   
 The clearest statement for the integration of mathematics as a ground for a 
science is in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.  Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic reformulates the problem of dogmatism and empiricism.  Kant’s 
reformulation of the empiricist/dogmatic opposition leads to a philosophical view that 
allows truth with certainty without having to refer to any spurious metaphysics.   
2. 1 Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 
 
 According to Kant, Idealism has some general characteristics.  Idealism states 
objects exist “in-themselves” outside of space & time, and therefore outside any 
possibility of experience; furthermore, it is impossible to provide any proof for the 
existence of such objects.  The two examples provided by Kant are Descartes 
                                                 
14
 Plato ultimately thinks that we cannot know anything.  But this follows clearly from the view that 
there are these immutable objects outside of space & time which can not be “known.”  Plato thinks that 
things in the world of space & time “participate” in the universal forms (See Naomi Reshotko, 
unpublished manuscript, “Plato's Epistemological Paradox: The Knowable Cannot be Known”). 
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“material idealism” and Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism.  Kant observes that 
Berkeley’s idealism is problematic in general because it assumes that space is 
imaginary.  What follows from this assumption is that objects in space are also 
imaginary.15  Thus, there are only imaginary objects in the world, and we never know 
what they are.16  It is clear that Berkeley’s idealism is too problematic to defend in 
any length.  The “Material Idealism” of Descartes is not a better formulation of the 
problem of knowledge according to Kant.  Descartes’ idealism, according to Kant, is 
no better than Berkeley’s idealism.  Descartes wants to prove existence by assuming 
external existence (non-imaginary); proof of external existence allows for Descartes 
to posit the ‘I am,’ but nothing more, we are unable, according to Descartes to go 
beyond proving our own existence.17   
 Kant goes on to talk about intuition in idealism.  Idealism does not allow a 
coherent theory of intuition in order to come to any knowledge.  As stated above, any 
“knowledge” that we think we have is unstable.  This is yet another corollary of 
idealism, and the positing of objects outside of space & time.  Furthermore, since we 
can’t come to know objects directly (through intuition—i.e. Plato), we need to make 
                                                 
 
15
 Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp, B275.  Although Plato is not 
mentioned in this, we see that Plato’s formulation of Idealism makes this claim as well.    
 
16
 Kant provides his own theory on how we gather knowledge of objects in space & time through 
intuition (that is, how objects appear to us in their immediacy without going into any technical 
philosophical jargon—Plato’s objection to this is that objects in space & time are too unstable, that is 
why he want to posit objects outside of space & time, in order to guarantee that not one perception is 
what is called “knowledge.”  This would be the response by Plato ultimately, for a detailed discussion 
see Socratic dialogue, Protagoras.  
 
17
 Ibid. B275 
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inferences from the objects that appear to us.  This inference is supposed to be stable 
(see Reshotko’s account of Platonic epistemology mentioned above).18   
 For Kant, old metaphysics consists of just this lack of distinction between 
things-in-themselves, and objects of experience.  Things in-themselves are objects 
which are unconditioned by the human mind, while objects of appearance are 
conditioned objects.  Space & time make the dividing line between the unconditioned 
and the conditioned.  If objects are possible objects of experience, Kant states that 
these objects lie in space & time; we can have knowledge about them, and make 
knowledge claims.  If on the other hand, objects are not possible objects of 
experience, then they necessarily lie outside of space & time—and therefore, nothing 
can be known about them.19 
2.2 Natural Science as Philosophy 
 
 The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics presents what Kant’s view of 
what a science should be, in connection to positing things in space and time.  Before 
Kant, science suffers from the over-abundance of metaphysics.  The main problem 
with this sort of metaphysics is twofold.  One the one hand, there is Hume as the main 
proponent of the view that it is impossible to come to know anything at all because of 
all the flux in the world which constitutes our proximate reality. This reality is 
nothing but flux; anything that we come to say about the world is unfounded because 
                                                 
 
18
 Ibid. B291-B294, Reshotko states that it is necessary to “set the bar high” with respect to knowledge, 
this guarantees that we have a stable and reliable epistemology.  Thus, Ultimately, Kant would be 
categorized as a version of Protagoras.  
 
19
 Platonists will obviously disagree with this but this is not meant to give an argument against 
Platonists.  At the conclusion of this section, it will be demonstrated that Kant’s view can be developed 
into a metaphysically consistent view with current theories of mathematics (as well as some versions 
of Platonism). 
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we do not take into consideration the complexity of a world in flux.  The main 
consequence of this view is that we are unable to come to any knowledge a priori.  
That is, we are unable to come to any knowledge without experience.  Furthermore, 
we are unable to come to know anything after we ‘experience’ things.  Thus, we are 
unable to have any cognition whatever.20  Kant’s main problem for philosophy lies in 
asking whether it is possible to come to know things a priori, or before experience.  In 
order to do this Kant sets himself the task to reveal the failure of philosophy before 
him.  According to Kant, the failure of philosophy before him is due to being trapped 
in “spurious metaphysics.”  Philosophers before Kant see philosophy as the vehicle to 
ultimate truth—Truth as “things-in-themselves.”  This kind of philosophizing is what 
has allowed for philosophy to be stuck without advancing.  Kant’s view of philosophy 
comes from the use of the synthetic method as well as the analytic method which will 
bring about a “science that shall display all its articulations, as the structure of a quite 
peculiar faculty of cognition in its natural combination.”21  For Kant this science is 
nearer intuition than other sciences which in the past have attempted such endeavors, 
but failed because these sciences have ended up with seemingly coherent metaphysics 
of abstract objects.22  
                                                 
 
20
 Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, [4:258], here Kant presents Hume’s 
“destructive philosophy” which criticizes any type of metaphysics.  Kant very poignantly rejects 
Hume’s empiricism.  Kant notes that Hume himself is puzzled about the question of metaphysics—
Hume himself falls into a metaphysical trap.  
 
21
 Ibid. [4:264] 
 
22
 Ibid. Kant does not mention this but we could mention Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz 
to mention a few.  The rationalists definitely fall under this category.  At least the rationalist want a 
rigorous way to derive their views, but they also end up with spurious metaphysics because they fail to 
make the distinction between the “things-in-themselves” and objects of possible experience.  
 11
 Kant’s complaint against the “old metaphysics” consists in the fact that there 
is no necessary link between cognition and objects.  Cognition is simply what is 
possible to experience in this world.  Before Kant, it was necessary to make objects in 
the world completely separate entities about which metaphysical statements are 
merely assumed.  The proofs that follow from these metaphysical statements are 
merely a priori; that is, a priori definitions are given, proofs follow from 
definitions/axioms, then (propositions) and corollaries from propositions.23  Kant’s 
critique of this kind of “proof” and “proving” both are merely theorizing about 
“things-in-themselves,” about which for Kant, nothing can be known.  
 Kant’s response to this “old metaphysics” is to state how it is possible to come 
to know things through reason, and be certain that this is actual knowledge (Hume’s 
challenge).  According to Kant the foundation for anything that can be stated is in 
analytic or synthetic judgments.  The former is merely explicative and the latter 
ampliative.24  Analytic judgments are explicative as they are merely 
tautological/definitional statements.  Analytic judgments have non-contradiction as 
their principle.  Synthetic judgments are ampliative in that these statements add 
something to our cognition.25  That is, a synthetic judgment adds something to our 
knowledge.  When I say a triangle is a three sided figure, I am merely restating a fact.  
But, when I say that the sum of the internal angles of any triangle is equal to 180˚, I 
                                                 
 
23
 The certainly rigorous example of this is Spinoza’s proof of the existence of God.  What is important 
to note is how Spinoza is talking about God as a “thing-in-itself.”  One of the striking conclusions for 
Spinoza is that there is part of the human mind which has an infinite attribute.  Otherwise, it would be 
impossible to make the connection between the human and the divine. 
 
24
 Ibid. [4:266-267] 
 
25
 Ibid. [4:267] 
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am making a synthetic judgment.  For Kant, it is in this way that the structure of 
knowledge is constructed.  Although analytic judgments are always a priori, and 
follow the principle of contradiction, synthetic judgments can be a posteriori.26  All 
judgments about experience are synthetic (a posteriori); and without exception 
mathematical judgments are synthetic.27  Kant’s famous example of this is in the 
arithmetic statement “7+5=12.”  Following the foundation that Kant has provided, it 
is necessary that we use intuition to start analyzing this problem.  We might come to 
the realization that this statement is analytic.  That is, we simply respond that the 
answer is 12.  But this is incorrect because if it is the case that we are able to do this, 
we should have not problem doing this with larger numbers (where it is clear that 
using our hands to count would be quite cumbersome).  Thus, this is a synthetic 
statement, a priori.  That is, we do not need to experience this sum in the world for its 
truth to hold.  Euclidean Geometry also has this characteristic.28   
                                                 
 
26
 Ibid. [4:267-268] Analytic a posteriori judgments is a null class of judgments, that is it is impossible, 
according to Kant, to come to know things are they are in themselves through experience.  We note 
that in the case of the “old metaphysics” this is not the case since we are able to somehow “know” 
these things. 
 
27
 Ibid. [4:268] Mathematicians hold that the principle of contradiction is at the bottom of the reliability 
of mathematical knowledge.  Kant keenly observes that the principle of contradiction only works if we 
have another judgment to accompany our analysis; it is not by itself that synthetic judgments (in this 
way) work—this only works by presupposing other synthetic propositions. 
 
28
 Ibid. [4:268-269] Kant states that it is clear that this statement is synthetic.  Kant’s point about 
intuition is that we need to use our fingers to count if needed.  But there is nothing in “7+5=12” which 
immediately gives us the number 12.  Kant’s point is clearer if we try 234+585=819.  There is nothing 
in the sum that leads us to the answer, 819.  We don’t immediately get “819” when we think 
“234+585.”  Thus, this is a synthetic judgment, that is, it contains information about the world which I 
did not already know—such as the case for analytic statements.  For a further discussion on this see 
Gottfried Martin’s Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, Ch. 6, “Synthetic 
Judgment in Arithmetic” (discussed below); also see Johann Schulz, Appendix in Arithmetic and 
Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries,  Schulz gives a detailed formulations of how 
mathematical proofs are constructed.  He deals with the way in which theorems hold by way of either 
using a conceptual axiomatic approach, or Kant’s approach through the forms of intuition.  Kripke 
 13
 The main problem Kant sees in all previous philosophy is that mathematic 
propositions are thought of as analytic (a priori) while metaphysical propositions are 
thought of as synthetic a priori.  Thus we see that Hume would not have allowed for 
mathematical statements as synthetic a priori (given his skepticism). 29  Finally, Kant 
states that metaphysical statements have to be grounded in cognition.  The conclusion 
from all this is that for any metaphysical statement to be grounded, it has to be an 
object of possible experience.30  Kant argues in order to have a ground for a 
possibility of grounding metaphysics in possible experience by answering the 
following questions:  
1) How is pure mathematics possible? 
2) How is pure natural science possible?  
3) How is metaphysics in general possible? 
4) How is metaphysics as a science possible?31       
The answer to these questions makes up the whole of Kant’s argument against the 
“old metaphysics.”   
 The common thread among all these questions is that judgments are to be 
grounded in pure intuition.32  One might question (this was certainly Plato’s thesis for 
                                                                                                                                           
(1972, pp. 274-275) offers a devastating objection to Kant’s distinction between the analytic/synthetic 
distinction stating that some a priori judgments are both a priori and contingent.  Kripke’s example is 
referencing a yard stick in Paris at time0 measuring one meter. A priori, the observer knows that the 
measurement is “one meter” long.  The observer must fix the reference to this one meter stick.  Fixing 
the reference makes it a problem of a priori judgments to be conclusive.  Resolving this is a topic for 
another paper.  The idea is that if we take Kant as the point of departure, we are able to see the 
minimum requirements for us to think about beliefs and judgments in general.    
 
29
 [4:272-273] Kant once again charges Hume for holding this view—Hume rejects mathematics as 
synthetic a priori, and as the rest of all other philosophers and mathematicians, holds that all 
mathematical propositions are analytic.  What Kant’s sees as a grave mistake is to regard metaphysics 
as synthetic a priori.  That is, metaphysical propositions are true regardless of our cognitions; they give 
us new information about the world (and even beyond).    
30
 Ibid. [4:274], this is also the subject of “How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?” [4:276-280]. 
 
31
 Ibid. [4:280] 
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arguing against any position that relied on the senses) how it is possible to intuit 
anything a priori…Kant’s answer to this is to look at things as a representation as 
they appear in their immediacy.33  One might ask, how can the intuition precede the 
object itself?  The answer arises from a reference to old metaphysics, where any kind 
of statement regarding objects of intuition is impossible because these statements 
refer to things as they are in themselves.  It is only in this way that intuitions (that 
lead to representations) would not take place a priori.34  Kant’s formulation of how 
we are able to intuit things a priori is as follows: 
There is thus only one way in which it is possible for my intuition to precede 
the actuality of the object and take place as cognition a priori, namely if it 
contains nothing else than the form of sensibility, which in me as subject 
precedes al lactual impressions through which I am affected by objects. […] 
from it [that objects can be intuited in the form of sensibility] follows: that all 
propositions which concern merely this form of sensible intuition will be 
possible and valid for  objects of the senses; equally the converse, that 
intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things other 
than objects of our senses.35    
 
The pure intuitions Kant is referring to are space & time (S&T).  Adding to the 
critique of the old metaphysics, Kant states that prior to him, space & time were 
thought of as pure concepts or as “things-in-themselves”.  When talking about objects 
in the world, such as geometrical figures, Kant states that it should be the case that we 
should be able to completely find two exact objects.  If it was the case that space & 
time were “things-in-themselves” and not pure forms of intuition, we would have no 
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33
 Ibid. [4:282] 
 
34
 Ibid. [4:282-283] 
 
35
 Ibid. [4:282-283] 
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problem with this task.  However, when we see that the reflection of our left hand is 
our right hand, there is something awkward about this.36  Kant’s point is that there is 
incongruence when we try to combine our left hand to the reflection in the mirror (the 
right hand).  The reason for this is that things are not appearances of things as they are 
in themselves, but forms of sensible intuition.37  Thus, Kant states, we come to our 
conclusion about mathematics, specifically, geometry and arithmetic; mathematical 
objects are grounded in sensible intuition—they are not appearance of things as they 
are “in-themselves”38  One might ask, as Plato did, why we would not want to do this 
kind of epistemological “grounding.” Kant’s position could be categorized as a 
relativist position, because we could say that our senses or our sensibility39 are too 
unstable to be able to guarantee any type of epistemological ground.  This seems to be 
an easy way out from Kant’s genius, and general insight about the limitations of 
philosophy and metaphysics specifically.  For Kant, the geometer, as he/she sits in his 
desk thinking about geometric figures and propositions can see that lines, for example 
are part of sensible experience.  They are not merely subjective illusions, but objects 
of ordinary experience.40    Kant’s view of Idealism thus: 
                                                 
 
36
 Ibid. [4:286], Kant’s examples also include geometrical figures, but his point is clearer when we use 
the hand example.  If it is the case that we see things that “participate” in forms, it should be the case 
that we find two things that are identical at all times.  
 
37
 Ibid. [4:286] 
 
38
 Ibid. [4:287] 
 
39
 This would certainly be Spinoza’s critique of Kant.  For Spinoza, the affects are unreliable, and thus 
we must do away from sensibility to make room for Reason. 
 
40
 Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, [4:288] Here, once again, Kant states that 
if we want to call for metaphysical entities when we speak about geometric figures, we are not able to 
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Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none other than thinking 
beings; the other things which we believe to perceive in intuition are only 
representations in the thinking beings, to which in fact no object outside the 
latter corresponds. Say on the contrary: things are given to us as objects of our 
senses situated outside us, but of what they may be in themselves we know 
nothing; we only know their  appearances, i.e. the representations they bring 
about in us when they affect our senses.41 
   
Thus it seems that the idealist position has a harder time justifying objects as 
appearances of “things-in-themselves.”  
 Furthermore, geometers, and mathematicians do not merely use the senses to 
comet to proof the indubitability of geometric figures, or arithmetical axioms.  It is 
necessary to use the understanding to come to judgments about the world which 
might be true or false.42  Kant is clear that “illusions” can arise whether we conceive 
of space & time as sensible intuitions or as “things-in-themselves.”  The “illusion” 
arises from our carelessness.  To this regard Kant makes the following point about 
mathematics:  
My doctrine of the ideality of space & time, therefore, so far from making the 
whole world of the senses into mere illusion, is rather the only means of 
securing the application to actual objects of one of the most important 
cognitions, namely that which mathematics expounds a priori, and of 
preventing it from being held to be mere illusion, because without this 
observation it would be quite impossible to decide whether the intuitions of 
space & time, which we take from no experience and which yet lie in our 
representation a priori, were not chimeras of the brain made by us to which no 
object corresponds, at least not adequately, and thus geometry itself a mere 
illusion; whereas on the contrary, just because all objects of the world of the 
senses are mere appearances, we have been able to show the indisputable 
validity of geometry in respect to them.43 
                                                                                                                                           
ground our concepts except in “spurious metaphysics” where we call for “pure logic” (as a thing-in-
itself).  
 
41
 Ibid. [4:289] 
 
42
 Ibid. [4:290-292] 
 
43
 Ibid. [4:292] 
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Kant’s main argument here is that if we grant that we are speaking about appearances 
of “things-in-themselves,” we cannot possibly be sure of the validity of our 
statements (since we can never know things as they are in themselves). 
 The second part of the Prolegomena deals with the question “how is Pure 
Natural Science possible?”  From the foregoing discussion, we can already see that 
Kant has provided the ground for the possibility of natural science.  For Kant, 
“[n]ature is the existence of things, insofar as the latter is determined according to 
universal laws.”44  Once again if by nature, we meant the existence of things-in-
themselves, we would never know nature; not a priori—and certainly not a posteriori.  
A priori reasoning deals with analysis of concepts (from which we form analytic 
judgments). These analytic judgments, as mentioned earlier, are mere tautologies.  
We cannot possibly learn anything new by analyzing these types of concepts (about 
nature).  According to Kant, knowing things a priori necessarily involves our 
understanding’s conformity to these laws, not the other way around (that is, we do not 
go around just positing laws of nature…).  Furthermore, knowledge of nature a 
posteriori, or through experience, is impossible because this would indicate that we 
could have such cognition about things-in-themselves.45 
 What then, is the ground for the possibility of science?  The key is 
mathematics applied to the appearances.46  Kant claim is that this formulation allows 
the possibility for objects of inner senses as well as objects of outer senses.  How is it 
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 Ibid. [4:294] 
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 Ibid. [4:294] 
 
46
 Ibid. [4:295] 
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possible to come to such a conclusion?  It is because we are concerned with the sum 
total of all objects of experience.  Thus, cognition about what could not be objects of 
experience would be “hyperphysical.”  That is this cognition would only hold in 
thought, not in application.  It is thus, that we are able to come to hold that objects of 
experience are a priori possible and precede all experience. 47  
 After we have this possibility for science, there seems to be a lack of clarity as 
to what exactly these objects we have thus mentions are about.  In sections §21 & 
§21[B]48, Kant provides tables which are subject to the universal conditions of 
intuition: Namely, the “Logical table of judgments”, the “transcendental table of 
concepts of the understanding,” and the “Pure physiological table of universal 
principles of natural science.”  These are supposed to be the foundational principles 
as the ground for the possibility of knowledge.  These tables not only guarantee 
knowledge, but they guarantee synthetic judgments a priori.  That is, this foundation 
Kant has provided is not only knowledge a priori (prior to any experience), but we 
can also build upon this knowledge (thus the synthetic element).  This is the 
cornerstone of a natural science.49 
 Experience and reason are well connected, according to Kant, but it is not 
always the case that reason leads us to judgments about the world which are true.  
The third section of the Prolegomena deals with this specific question.  How is it that 
                                                 
 
47
 Ibid. [4:295-296] 
 
48
 Ibid. [4:302-305] 
 
49
 The last two questions about the possibility of metaphysics, and metaphysics as a science follows the 
same argument Kant has given thus far.  In order for us to have any type of knowledge about the world 
we must have a ground upon which synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. 
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reason can make mistakes, and yet, we are to have an objective system about nature 
(and the world) which will hold independently of experience?  This question seems to 
follow from the two previous questions about mathematics and science.  It is not 
clear, Kant states, that once we have established the objectivity of mathematics and 
natural science, we are better because the objectivity of such things is for its own 
sake.  The purpose of metaphysics, for Kant, is  
namely the occupation of reason merely with itself and the acquaintance with 
objects that is supposed to arise immediately from brooding over its own 
concepts, without needing the mediation of experience or in any way being 
able to reach that acquaintance through experience.50 
 
Mathematics and natural science exist for themselves.  Therefore, it is of no use for us 
to be able to see that they exist in this independent manner.  What is interesting is to 
be able to come to know things that are objective, but that depend on the structure of 
reason as it exists in humans—that is Kant’s project, to provide “the grounding for a 
science which is to contain the system of all these cognitions a priori [ideas which 
correspond to objects in the world], that without such a separation metaphysics is 
absolutely impossible, and at best random […]”51  In order to see that Kant provides a 
ground for the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, we need to go back and see 
that if we thought that metaphysics consisted of describing “things-in-themselves,” 
we would merely have analytic propositions to ground our knowledge for science (or 
any other knowledge for that matter).52  One of Kant’s clearest statements about the 
                                                 
 
50
 Ibid. [4:327] 
 
51
 Ibid. [4:329] 
 
52
 Reshotko’s response to this once again is to say that although we are not able to know the forms of 
things in the world, we clearly see that some people are on better epistemological grounds than others; 
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grounds for the possibility of knowledge was to divide our realm of inquiry into the 
realm of understanding (space & time), and the realm of Reason (as a things that 
deals with all objects including those that are not inside space & time).53 
 Kant furthers his explanation in sections §46-§49 of the Prolegomena on the 
psychological ideas.  Previous to Kant, there was a confusion of the formulation “S is 
P.”  Descartes for example, as already mentioned, could only hold the validity of the 
“S;” and while others could not even do this (Hume),54 Kant’s formulation of ideas is 
allows for the formulation “S is P” to hold a priori.   This is not merely by assuming 
away the validity of S, or P, but through stating that our knowledge depends on the 
agreement between ideas (in the understanding and in Pure Reason), and things in 
nature.55 
 The last part of Kant’s Prolegomena deals with the questions about the 
possibility of metaphysics in general and metaphysics as a science.  The answer to 
these questions should be clear at this point.  It is only possible to know objects of 
possible experience.  Any formulation that deals with objects outside the realm of 
                                                                                                                                           
this could be a criticism of Kant, but it is not necessarily clear that Kant disagrees with this—even in 
Kant’s formulation of the grounds for a science, we are clearly in a position to make errors, and Kant 
does state this about the understanding [that is, reason restricted to space & time].  The way for us to 
disentangle mistakes of the understanding from knowledge of things as they appear to us is to have 
already established an ontology of objects of possible experience.  This way, we are able to rely on 
fundamental principles (i.e. the principle of contradiction) as the ground for the possibility making 
objective epistemic claims. 
 
53Ibid. [4:329], §41-§42 make this clear, Kant states, “all pure cognitions have this in common.”  That 
is, all pure cognitions exist a priori as possible objects of experience, in space & time.  Section [4:331] 
also makes it clear that the task of deriving metaphysics is for us to keep a list of things that are 
possible to experience, but, with the help of mathematics and natural science.  
 
54
 Although Hume does assume that there something to whom things in the world appear… 
 
55
 Ibid. [4:329] 
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experience will deal with objects about which we can only speculate, but cannot 
know.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
56
 See sections §50-§56; section §56 deals with the Theological Idea in which Kant makes this point 
starkly.  It should be highly stressed that the first two antimonies presented about space & time; and 
about the world make the whole of Kant’s view on epistemology even clearer.  The first antimony 
states that either: (thesis) space & time have a beginning, or (antithesis) space & time are infinite.  In 
the first case, we are dealing with Kant’s realm of the space & time as boundaries for experience; in 
the latter case, we are dealing with things-in-themselves (because it is not possible to have the infinite 
as an object of possible experience).   Some versions of Platonism respond to Kant by showing that 
objects outside space and time are knowable (e.g. Full-Blooded-Platonism). 
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3. Ontology of Mathematics 
 Kant’s conception of mathematics as the ground of knowledge cannot be 
overlooked when talking about mathematics.  Kant argues that mathematics is 
constructed due to the capacity for experience with which we are equipped.  For Kant, 
mathematics is the truest case of synthetic judgments a priori par excellence.  
Ontology of mathematics refers to what type of entities mathematics things are.  For 
Kant, objects in nature are part of how humans are and how the world is.  The 
Kantian/Newtonian model gives us a view of the world in which there is integration 
between the “pure forms of intuition” (space & time) and the physical world.  The 
way we conceive of mathematical objects and mathematical structures affects our 
understanding of these objects.  Kant’s argument for the “construction” of 
mathematical objects within space and time, for him, assures that we have epistemic 
access for mathematical objects.  The competing camp in the ontology of 
mathematics against “constructing” our knowledge of mathematical structures and 
objects goes back to Platonic Idealism.  This section presents different ways that the 
mathematics can be conceived, furthering and challenging Kant’s vision for the 
structure of knowledge and mathematics lying at the foundation of knowledge. 
3.1 Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Ontology of Mathematics57 
 
 Gottfried Martin’s Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his 
Contemporaries gives a detailed account of the history of mathematics and its attempt 
to ground mathematics as a pure science.  It seems that all mathematicians follow a 
platonic line of thought to ground mathematics.  It is only through Johann Schulz that 
                                                 
57
 Arithmetic and geometry 
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we have a correct interpretation of Kant’s philosophical insight about knowledge and 
its dependence on the forms of intuition. 
 This question is dealt with in “The Axiomatics and Logic of Mathematics.”  
The main problem (already raised in the Prolegomena) seems to be that the 
axiomatization of mathematics is a conceptual/analytic form of grounding.  Our 
epistemology depends on assumptions about concepts, from which we can derive our 
proofs.58  Martin cites five different ways in which mathematics can be derived 
(starting with axioms): 
1) Arithmetic and geometry depend on axioms and are constructive in 
structure. Kant 
2) Arithmetic and geometry depend on axioms but are deductive in structure 
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843), Husserl, Hilbert, Peano, Zermelo, 
Johann Friedrich König (1798-1865) 
3) Arithmetic and geometry can be deduced purely logically, both principles 
and the theorems. Leibniz, Wolff, Hermann Günter Grassmann (1809-
1877), Russell, [Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Wittgenstein 
4) Arithmetic is logically deductive, geometry is axiomatically constructive.  
Practically all the great mathematicians of the nineteenth century followed 
Gauss in making such a distinction between arithmetic and geometry […] 
5) Arithmetic is logically deductive, geometry axiomatically deductive. 
Frege, Vloemans.59  
 
What is important to notice here is that there is a disagreement about the way in 
which our grounding of mathematics should take place.  Virtually all 2-5 go against 
Kant’s view.  Martin’s states that we could easily classify all these formulations in 
Kantian terms of analytic and synthetic.  Any logistic or axiomatic formulation will 
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 See Martin, Gottfried, Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, Ch. 1, pp. 3-10. 
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 Ibid. pp. 6-7 
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fall under analytic statements.60  Any constructive or deductive formulation will fall 
under synthetic propositions.61  Martin points out that Kant is not well known for his 
thinking about mathematics, but we see that Kant has great insight not only for the 
axiomatization of mathematics but also philosophy in general. 
Kant’s The Concept of Negative Quantities (1763) shows the relation between 
numbers of opposition.  It is not that a “negative quantity” exists.62  With respect to 
mathematicians, Kant states:  
The concept of negative quantities has long been used in mathematics and it is 
also of the greatest importance there.  Nevertheless, the ideal which most have 
gotten of it and the explanation they  have given is astonishing and 
contradictory, although no inaccuracy has arisen in application, for the 
particular rules replaced the definition and guaranteed the use; but what may 
have been mistaken in the judgment about the nature of the abstract concept 
has remained useless and has been without consequence63 
 
Thus, even though mathematics is derived through methods 2-5 (see above), we still 
see a great deal of misinterpretation about the status of negative numbers.64  Kant 
clearly states that negative numbers are merely the opposition in quantity.  The 
clearest example is in wealth and debts, regarding which, the relation ship is one of 
                                                 
60
 Recall above our formulation of Kant’s view of a science.  If it is the case that we are to have a 
reliable ground for the possibility of a science, it is not the case that we can derive our entire 
epistemology merely from analytic propositions.  In the case of Kant, axioms are properties of the 
structure with which we form our understanding, thus, axioms are not merely statements derived from 
logic.  
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 Ibid. pg. 7 
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 Ibid. pg. 54 
 
63
 Ibid. pg 55, Kant’s commentary from The Concept of Negative Quantities, reproduced in Martin 
(1985 [1972]). 
 
64
 Given the deduction of “negative numbers” for example, “negative numbers” are numeric entities, 
not a quantity relation.     
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“canceling out.”  The interpretation that negative numbers are entities on their own 
comes from the lack of consideration of the transcendentality of numbers.65 
  “Combinatorics and the Idea of a Systematic Ontology” discusses the way in 
which we are to build an ontology through which we can describe the world as it 
appears to us.  The main works in the history of mathematics where we find an 
attempt to derive an ontology of mathematics is Leibniz’s De arte Combinatoria.  
This work presents the way in which our knowledge is made up of elementary 
concepts and complex concepts.66  These concepts form knowledge through a system 
of signs (that is of the form “S is P”).  Martin clearly points out that Leibniz’s system 
depends on the existence of elementary concepts.  Furthermore, it is not clear that 
Leibniz thinks that there are synthetic propositions (where the S is already contained 
in the P—i.e. the sum of the interior angles of any triangle sum to 180˚).67  Recall 
Kant’s rigorous derivation of what a science should be.  The foundation of any 
science is made up of analytic and synthetic propositions; these propositions make up 
knowledge.  There are stark differences between Kant and Leibniz though:  with 
regards to the distinction of appearances of things in space & time and “things-in-
                                                 
65
 Ibid. pp. 55-58, Martin gives a detailed account of Kant’s insight into irrational numbers (which 
includes π and e) and imaginary, or complex numbers (√-1).  Mathematicians simply ignore what this 
could possibly mean in terms of philosophy… 
 
66
 Ibid. pp. 60-61, Leibniz’s attempt to derive all our knowledge depends on basic definitions once 
again (recall Kant’s insistence on making a distinction between appearances and “things-in-
themselves.”  Leibniz’s systematic ontology depends on analytic judgments (à la Kant).  The problem 
with Leibniz’s systematic ontology is that it is supposed to describe all our knowledge of things 
through the various combinations of “elementary” and “complex” concepts.  Leibniz states that there is 
a universal science (sciencia universalis) which is made up of the art of signs (ars characteristica).  
Thus, simple and complex concepts are in line with this coupling of the art of signs which make up a 
universal science (pg. 61).  
 
67
 Ibid. pg. 61 
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themselves,” Leibniz makes reference to “things-in-themselves,” whereas Kant 
clearly thinks this is impossible to do.68        
 Thus we come to Kant’s assertion that any ontology, if it is to have any solid 
grounding upon which we can make epistemic claims, must be derived from 
fundamental axioms, which stand on their own, but connect the human mind to the 
outer world of experience.  In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant states: 
Pure synthesis, thought of generally, gives us the pure concept of the intellect.  
By this synthesis, however, I mean that which depends on a base of synthetic 
unity a priori.  Thus our counting (above all seen in the larger numbers) is a 
synthesis according to concepts, because it is done  according to a common 
base of unity (e.g., the decimal)69 
 
Thus, synthetic judgments in arithmetic (and in general) depend on an “Allness” 
which provides the unity of concepts upon which knowledge stands.70  This “Allness” 
can be described as Kant’s “Schematism of the pure concepts of understanding.”  The 
schematism connects apperception to pure concepts.  That is, to synthetic 
propositions a priori, in this case, arithmetic propositions.71  Gottfried Martin notes 
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 Leibniz’s definition of a monad comes to mind; see “The Principles of Philosophy, or the 
Monadology” in his Philosophical Essays, pg. 213, a Monad—“a simple substance that enters into 
composites—simple, that is, without parts […] [a]nd there must be simple substances, since there are 
composites […]” Leibniz goes on to define the mind of the Monad as substance that can have 
knowledge of God (29, pg. 217).  What is even more startling is that Leibniz equates God with 
knowledge (47, 48, pg. 219).  It is clear from Leibniz’s conception of knowledge dependant on God 
that Kant’s critique of philosophy aims to surpass this type of idealist ontology.  Leibniz clearly states 
that there is no difference between “things-in-themselves” and things as they appear to us.  Leibniz 
goes even further and states that we as Monads participate in the “best of possible worlds” that 
depends on God [its architect].  Kant’s objection is that we cannot know this.     
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 Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. F. Max Müller, B104. 
 
70
 See Martin, Gottfried, Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, pg. 86. 
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 See Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp, B176-B187.  For Kant, 
schemata represent the unity of apperception with appearances of objects in the world (space & time) 
(B179-B180).  These schemata, Kant states, are products of imagination, but it is not imagination in 
the ordinary sense, it is imagination as it is connected with objects that are actually appearing in the 
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Kant’s obscurity72 in trying to work out the exactness of schematism with regards to 
mathematics, specifically, to numbers.  Martin’s states that we must think of the 
concept of number as “inseparable from the perception of time.”73  Thus, the 
schematism allows the senses to be connected to the outer appearances in unity.  It is 
ultimately this unity which allows us to have synthetic judgments a priori (in 
particular those of arithmetic74 and geometry75).   
3.2 From Kant to Contemporary Views on the Ontology of Mathematics  
 This section deals with current views in the philosophy of mathematics.  We 
draw extensively from Balaguer (1998) who states that there are two equally 
defensible philosophies of mathematics.  These philosophies of mathematics are 
                                                                                                                                           
world (That is why we are able to have an objective reality that is stable, without having to fall under a 
Humean, or Berkeleyan trap).   
 
72
 In this regard, Kant has been attacked. 
 
73
 See Martin, Gottfried, Arithmetic and Combinatorics, Kant and his Contemporaries, pp. 87-88.  
Objections to Kant seem to be attacks about Kant’s “vagueness” and “obscurity.”  It is true that Kant’s 
chapter on the schemata is difficult to follow.  This does not mean that we revert back to Leibnizian 
logicism and think of numbers as having to necessitate a divine mind, given their eternal validity 
(Leibniz himself refers to this formulation as divine mathematics (mathesis divina). 
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 Martin gives the example of “7+5=12” and refers to the Prolegomena.  In addition, Kant states in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Kemp, B15-B16): “We might, indeed, at first suppose that the 
proposition 7+5=12 is a merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from 
the concept of a sum of 7 and 5.  But if we look more closely we find that the concept of the sum of 7 
and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is being 
taken as to what that single number may be which combines both.  The concept of 12 is by no means 
already thought immediately in thinking of the union of 7 and ; and I may analyze my concept of such 
a possible sum as long as I please, still I shall never find the 12 in it.  We have to go outside these 
concepts, and call in the aid of the intuition which corresponds to one of them, our five fingers, for 
instance as Stegler does in his Arithmetic, five points adding to the concept of 7, unit by unit, given the 
five of intuition.  For starting with the number 7, and for the concept of 5 calling in the aid of the 
fingers of my hand as intuition, I now add on e by one to the number 7 the unites which I previously 
took together to form the number 5, and with the aid of that figure [the hand] see the number 12 come 
into being.”   
 
75
 A similar kind of analysis can be done with geometry. 
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essential to economics to serve as foundations for what is and what is not plausible in 
economic theory.   
3.2a Mathematical Platonism 
 We have seen that in Kant’s formulation of science depends on the senses as a 
vehicle for understanding.  Mathematics, for Kant, allows us to “know” things 
independently of our ability to grasp what is at hand—but Kant’s analysis can only 
take us so far.  Kant’s “refutation” of idealism is not a refutation of Platonism 
altogether.  Furthermore, our analysis of the interrelation between natural science and 
mathematics has only been carried in terms of geometry and arithmetic.  Although, 
for the purposes of epistemology this is fine, we need to further analyze the 
consequences for the ontology of mathematics of the later developments in 
mathematics—namely set theory.  Mark Balaguer’s Platonism & anti-Platonism in 
Mathematics gives us a nice way to bring both Kantian and Platonic adherents in the 
philosophy of mathematics under an equally defensible ontology76 (and 
epistemology) of mathematics.  Balaguer states that there is a “fictionalist” account of 
mathematics which holds that statements like “3 is a prime number” is a fictional 
statement—the entity of the number 3 need no necessarily exist.  The Platonist variant 
of this is that the number 3 does in fact exist.  Balaguer’s analysis allows us to view 
two ways in which a mathematical ontology (the nature of mathematical “entities”) 
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 The Kantian version ultimately gets called “fictionalism” and the Platonist version FBP (full-
blooded-Platonism).  Balaguer ultimately thinks that in terms of ontology and epistemology, these are 
the only defensible views—and ultimately what he calls “isomorphic” (or equivalent).   
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and a mathematical epistemology (the acquisition of knowledge of these entities) can 
be carried out in a non-question-begging manner.77  
 The first half of Platonism & anti-Platonism in Mathematics deals with 
defending Full-Blooded-Platonism (FBP).  FBP is the theory that mathematical 
objects exist only insofar as they are logically possible.78  For this task, Balaguer has 
to answer to typical objections to Platonism in Mathematics (as mathematical 
objects).  The main argument against Platonism is the epistemological argument 
which states that: 
1) Human beings exist entirely within space-time. 
2) If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then they exist outside of 
space and time 
Therefore by CTK [Causal Theory of Knowledge]79, 
3) If there exist any abstract mathematical objects, then human beings could 
not have knowledge of them. 
Therefore,  
4) If mathematical Platonism is correct, then human beings could not attain 
mathematical knowledge. 
5) Human beings have mathematical knowledge. 
Therefore,  
6) Mathematical Platonism is not correct.80 
Balaguer proceeds to give a taxonomy of strategies to call into question the validity of 
the epistemic argument against Platonism.  Ultimately, what Balaguer want to do is 
defeat all versions of Platonism except the FBP version.  The first strategy is to call 
into question the validity of the CTK.  It is not clear that the transition from (2) to (3) 
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follows smoothly.  One possible view is that we can attain some knowledge of these 
non-spatiotemporal objects via mathematical intuition.  The question now becomes 
how this is possible.  We have to argue for the immateriality of the mind.  This view, 
however, is unintelligible, because the “transfer” of knowledge takes place between 
non-spatiotemporal objects (which are causally inert) and the minds in space and 
time.  What this amounts to is focusing on the immateriality of the mind—as separate 
from the brain, which could allow for a type of cross-realm communication.  This is a 
simple argument to block (1) but of course not enough.  What ultimately needs to be 
developed from this is an ontological thesis which states that there exist real mental 
states which are irreducible to merely physical states.81  If it is the case that the mind 
is spatiotemporal, Balaguer argues, statements and thoughts are not only reducible to 
physical states, but to Turing Machines—that is causally connected statements by 
reductive algorithms.  If our minds are physical, then we can reduce minds to 
machines.  It is arguably the case that our minds are irreducible to machines (for this 
has consequences in all realms of philosophy and other sciences).  Balaguer here is 
presenting Kurt Gödel’s view on what mathematical objects might be, and how it is 
possible to have cross-realm contact with such objects.   
 Gödel’s view was that the purpose of the mind is through intuition to come to 
know what “reality” was like in forming thoughts, through the senses, about the 
appearances of reality.  Thus, for Gödel, it seems that reality is connected through the 
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spatiotemporal “reality” in some way.82  We have called into question (1) but we 
must move onto the rest of the argument.  
 The next move for Balaguer is to try to reject (2).  Although this takes quite a 
bit of effort, we shall only provide the mode of (“naturalistic”) Platonism represented 
by Penelope Maddy.  This view states that it is possible to have knowledge of abstract 
objects through sense perception.83  Maddy’s view amounts to correlating sense 
perception with the notion of sets.84  Balaguer has a discussion about the way in 
which sets are defined in the philosophy of mathematics—one can define sets in the 
traditional abstract sense where one can state the categorical relationship among 
objects inside a set.  The second definition of a set deals with a “naturalized” variant 
which deals with defining sets in terms of physical objects (further divided into 
singular and aggregate).  Thus the set of 1 egg, or many eggs represents a singular set, 
and the latter an aggregate (indefinite) set.  For the purposes of this paper, Balaguer 
concludes that it is not possible to correlate singular sets or aggregate sets to mental 
states (which make reference to the way in which we perceive each set differently).  
For Maddy, it seems that she wants to overcome the epistemic problem of knowledge 
by asserting a perceptual mechanism by which we are able to come in contact with 
mathematical objects (namely sets).  The problem raised by Balaguer is the way in 
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which we divide the singular set from the aggregate set is problematic when we start 
talking about mental states (and mental stuff in general).85  We have failed to reject 
(2) at this point, Balaguer calls on other forms of Platonism to try to do this. 
 The whole of these other arguments, as Balaguer suggests, are different ways 
to say that there can be knowledge without contact.  The first is a truly innocuous 
position which states that we do not need an explanation for how we can acquire 
knowledge of non-spatiotemporal objects.  This view of course tries to avoid the 
problem by not addressing it.86 
 The No-Contact Theory of Intuition (NCTI) which states that we can get 
knowledge of mathematical objects via “intuition.”87  This is an internal view that is 
problematic because it “merely restates the problem.”88    
 Next on the list we have holism and empirical confirmation of Willard Quine 
among others.  Quine’s view states that we have good reason to believe our 
mathematical theories are true because they are central to our worldview.  This 
includes having those mathematical theories being confirmed empirically (by using 
them in our scientific theories).  Balaguer clearly states that the problem with 
confirmation holism is that it is outright false.  Empirical findings do not prove 
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theories.  With respect to our worldview, confirmation holism does not speak to the 
“nominalistic content” of our scientific theories.  “Nominalistic content” refers to the 
use of non-mathematical language in order to express the theory at hand—even if the 
ontology is deemed “fictional” (mathematical objects are constructed).  Balaguer cites 
the “nominalization of quantum mechanics” as and example of this way of a 
“nominalization” which challenges that mathematics behind quantum mechanics can 
be expressed simply by logical relations.  Balaguer’s point is that the use of highly 
technical mathematical language in quantum mechanics does not prove that the 
mathematical theories behind the mathematical language are true.  The question here 
is the expression of the theory in terms of language; the ‘truth’ of the theory clearly 
does not depend on the method used (as in FBP).89  
 The “necessity” view bears similar problems to the conformational view.  The 
necessity view states that we can acquire knowledge about mathematical objects 
through our senses, and this knowledge is necessarily true.  Taking the example of 
adding two numbers in arithmetic we can construct an entire “knowledge” of numbers 
according to this necessity view.  It seems that this view is an attempt at restating 
(although badly) what Kant points to, and Gottfried Martin further develops.  The 
only necessity in connection to arithmetic is dealing with what Kant called analytic 
statements (from which we cannot learn anything).  Analytic statements must hold 
independent of how we construct our theory of arithmetic.  Balaguer’s objection is 
very much Kant’s, we cannot have knowledge of things merely by positing a 
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definition and deriving a system of “logic” from these definitions (this amounts to a 
tautological account of mathematics).90      
 All these versions of Platonism are what Balaguer calls non-plenitudinous 
forms of Platonism (that is, these forms of Platonism want to commit to some forms 
of mathematical objects and not others) which fail to satisfy all the epistemic 
challenges posed mainly by Paul Benacerraf which deal with the objection against 
Platonists that knowledge of mathematical objects is not possible without contact.  
This attack does defeat the various versions of Platonism that we have been briefly 
talking about.  The next step in the argument is to defend FBP against the 
Benacerrafian epistemic challenge. 
 As defined above, Full-Blooded Platonism commits itself to the existence not 
only of mathematical objects, but all objects which are logically possible.  In order to 
get epistemic access to this non-spatiotemporal realm, Balaguer claims that all we 
need to do is acquire knowledge of a purely mathematical theory which is consistent, 
acquiring knowledge of this theory is acquiring knowledge of the mathematical 
realm.  This is a seemingly simple response to the Benacerrafian challenge.  If we 
ponder about Nepalese villages that exist, we can say that there exist Nepalese 
villages.  Now, if we can take all possible Nepalese villages that could exist, Balaguer 
points out that one cannot have knowledge of these villages, but they do exist.  
“Dreaming up” the Nepalese villages might be another objection that can be raised to 
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the FBPist.  According to Balaguer, the FBPists simply can respond by asserting that 
this “dreaming up” because of FBP, all possible Nepalese villages do exist.  That is, 
the FBPist commits to the existence of all possible Nepalese villages—this is the 
position by FBPists—every Nepalese village that has the logical possibly of 
existence, actually exists.  We saw earlier the other forms of Platonism cannot make 
this claim (i.e. naturalistic forms of Platonism can only claim certain types of objects 
but not other types).  Thus, a similar move can be done for mathematical objects.  The 
next set of objections comes obviously from the fact that we can “dream up” 
anything; what about beliefs and reference, it clearly is the case that we can’t just 
“dream up” any old story.  To block this worry, we need to do more work on FBP.   
 The “logically possible and consistent” assertion by FBPists has to be worked 
out more in detail in order to be able to claim a defensible stance.  Balaguer points out 
the two different ways in which statements can be ‘about’ something.  These 
statements ‘about’ something can be “metaphysically thick” or “metaphysically thin.”  
“Metaphysically thick” statements are ‘about’ something in which the subject has to 
be “connected” to the object “in an appropriate way.”91  What this amounts to is that 
the statement has to be mapped in the space/time grid.  Furthermore, there are 
“metaphysically thin” statements ‘about’ something.  These statements deal with 
subjects and objects which need not be necessarily real—Balaguer’s example is a 
little girl’s statement that “Santa Claus is fat.”  This is a consistent, coherent, 
statement which does not violate any ‘logic;’ but the fact that this statement is a 
“metaphysically thin” statement, is of value for the FBPists—reference about 
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mathematical objects (and others as well) need not be “metaphysically thick.”  In fact, 
reference to mathematical object can be used in the “metaphysically thin” sense to 
ease some worries about the “dreaming up” of objects in general.  If we are to defend 
FBP, Balaguer states, it has to come about through this route.  Through 
metaphysically thin statements, Balaguer, states, we are able to come to defend FBP.  
The full argument for FBP is given as follows: 
(i) FBP-ists can account for the fact that human beings can—without coming 
into contact with the mathematical realm—formulate purely mathematical 
theories 
(ii) FBP-ists can account for the fact that human beings can—without coming 
into contact with the mathematical realm—know of many of these purely 
mathematical theories that they are consistent 
(iii) If (ii) is true, then FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule) 
if mathematicians accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T is consistent     
 Therefore, 
 (iv) FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule) if mathematicians 
 accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T is consistent. 
 (v) If FBP is true, then every consistent purely mathematical theory truly 
 describes the mathematical realm, that is, truly describes some collection of 
 mathematical objects 
 Therefore, 
 (vi) FBP-ists can account for the fact that (as a general rule) if mathematicians 
 accept a purely mathematical theory T, then T truly describes part of the 
 mathematical realm.92 
 
The fact that mathematicians believe a theory does not mean that the theory will be 
consistent, and the fact that a theory is consistent is not enough to believe it.  The 
argument given here for FBP is to show that as a theory of mathematical objects, FBP 
can account for things that other versions of Platonism are not able to account for.  In 
order to defend FBP we need to look at the main objections leveled against FBP. 
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 The first thing to note about FBP is how it serves as a metaphysical 
foundation to mathematical theories.  One of the main set theories in mathematics is 
that developed by Zermelo and Fraenkel (denoted ZF set-theory)93.  Balaguer states 
that FBP services ZF set-theory much better than other forms of Platonism.  Balaguer 
cites two types of ZF Set-Theory, one where the continuum hypothesis94 is true (ZF + 
CH) and one where the continuum hypothesis is false (ZF – CH).  Other forms of 
Platonism are limited in talking about the mathematical realm based on how those 
forms of Platonism are formulated (naturalistic Platonism is restricted to what we can 
say about the natural world).  Since both set theories are consistent (that is, whether 
we take the continuum hypothesis to be true or false) we have two distinct theories 
which describe different universes of sets.  FBP is able to account for this, whereas 
other forms of Platonism scramble to reformulate their commitments.95 
 The next worry is to about the term “consistency.”  We define consistency as 
relating to a theory that is logically possible and non-contradictory in its description 
of the mathematical realm.  Thus, there is a worry that FBP entails a shift in the term 
“consistent” to mean “true” tautologically.  That is, FBP commits itself to a theory 
that is true, immediately after it is deemed consistent.  The response to this worry 
deals with providing an explanation on how we are able to restrict our domain of our 
mathematical theory to truly describe the mathematical realm.  This is done by seeing 
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how mathematical theories are grounded (in natural numbers, for example).  By 
seeing how mathematical theories are grounded in a natural way, we can then give a 
more comprehensive definition of consistency.  Consistency is that which is logically 
possible and also partially grounded in a natural way.96  This type of consistency 
allows us to posit type-token relationships metaphysically in mathematics (although 
this also extends to other areas of study where metaphysics is called for).  FBP allows 
for multiple responses to “open questions.”97  FBP allows multiple isomorphic98 
(equivalent) theories.  This, of course is subject to rigorous research and discovery.99  
 If FBP does so well being the house of multiple equivalent theories, there 
might be a problem establishing how to weed out the “bad” theories from the good 
ones.  Balaguer here refers us to the use of “standard models” of mathematics.  These 
standard models are axiomatically grounded models that have been developed based 
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on our limited contact with the mathematical realm.  This limited contact with the 
mathematical realm, Balaguer states, is enough ground mathematical theories.  Thus, 
the research that mathematicians do requires them to build upon existing “standard 
models.”  This “building upon” allows mathematicians to extend other theories by 
extending “standard models” or by building new models based on “our intuitions, 
notions and conceptions.”100   
 If we rely on our intuitions, notions and conceptions, one might say, as 
Balaguer states, that “there is no number 7.”  According to FBP, this is truly describes 
the mathematical realm.  The question arises when we speak of the entire 
mathematical realm.  A sentence like “there is no number 7” could amount to a 
mathematical theory with a whole in the sequence of natural numbers which is part of 
the mathematical realm, but it could not amount to a theory about the entire 
mathematical realm, since it is contradictory with our current notion of mathematics, 
and in particular, natural numbers.101  Thus, FBP is truly committed to logical 
statements which truly describe the mathematical realm.  Statements like “there is no 
number seven” might sound challenging to FBP but they are not interesting 
metaphysically.102 
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 Another objection similar to the last one is to say that FBPists concede that 
sentences like “there is no number 7 and “2+2=5” truly describe part of the 
mathematical realm, yet, these sentences seem plain false.  We notice that the 
objection is trying to attack FBPists inability to distinguish between theories.  The 
problem here, Balaguer, states, is that, there might be a way to formulate a model in a 
“non-standard” way where these sentences truly describe part of the mathematical 
realm.  But, when we use these sentences based on our current standard mathematical 
theories, these statements are false (in some absolute sense, and FBP is able to 
account for this by allowing the possibility to expand on open questions in 
mathematics).  Balaguer states that we might be able to formulate a theorem where 
“2+2=5” or that ‘5’ is equivalent to our current usage of ‘4.’  This might be a 
confusing way to proceed with any argument to try to build a new mathematical 
theory.103 
 The last important objection to FBP is to say that FBP does not account for 
the uniqueness of mathematical theories.  The non-uniqueness objection states that 
since we don’t have unique definitions of numbers, we cannot possibly come to any 
conclusive description of the mathematical realm.104  Since there is a contradiction in 
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these this instance, FBP must be false.  This is called the uniqueness objection to 
FBP.105 
 In “What Numbers Could not be,” Benacerraf deals with the non-uniqueness 
of mathematical theories which states that mathematical theories cannot be reduced to 
a unique theory.  That is, if it is the case that there are mathematical objects, and we 
are able to access the mathematical realm, why is it that mathematical objects can be 
described in the same manner?  To make this objection clearer, let’s look back at 
Kant’s example of “7+5.”  This objection deals with breaking down the 7 and the 5 
into their respective sub-components—that is stating 7 as “1+1+1+1+1+1+1” and 5 as 
“1+1+1+1+1.”  Another way to break down either 7 or 5 is into other sums.  Thus, 5 
can be expressed as “3+2” or “4+1” or “3+1+1” or “2+1+1+1” etc.106  Thus, there is 
nothing in “7+5” that immediately leads to “12.”  The problem here is epistemic.  
According to Benacerraf, there is no way to come to any conclusive statement about 
the mathematical realm because of this problematic.  The conclusion drawn by 
Benacerraf is a form of mathematical fictionalism (to be defended below) where our 
mathematical theories are “fictions,” but these “fictions” truly describe the 
mathematical realm.  Balaguer’s response to the non-uniqueness objection to FBP is 
to assert that non-uniqueness is not really a threat to FBP.  Looking at our Full 
Conception of Natural Numbers (FCNN), Balaguer states that the problem of 
uniqueness disappears when we look at our mathematical theories from a structural 
stance.  Viewing our mathematical theory structurally, uniqueness is overshadowed.  
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This is not merely a shift of focus.  If it was the case that a theory needs to have a 
unique reference for every object, then theories in other areas might be threatened.107  
Structuralism allows us to discern the main patterns at work in our mathematical 
theories.  When talking about abstract objects, Balaguer observes an intimate 
connection between numbers in general, abstract objects, reference and language.  It 
is not the case that we make reference to a chair in a singular way. The chair might 
have accidental properties which affect the way in which the chair is presented in the 
mind—there is not one unique way to conceive a chair.  FBP can embrace this simply 
by seeing that this non-uniqueness truly describes the way we experience the world 
and reference concrete and abstract objects.108  In the case of abstract objects, such as 
numbers, we can see that the number “7” for example, if referred to as “5+2” or any 
other combination instead of “7” can lead to skepticism.  There might be an endless 
questioning of what “7” really means.  In order to deflect skeptical arguments against 
our conception of numbers, Balaguer makes reference to our “full conception of 
natural numbers.”  This conception of natural numbers grounds our ability to come to 
knowledge, at least of numbers. 
 Thus far we have considered some of the main worries that we might have in 
holding the FBP view.  Given the various objections to FBP, according to Balaguer, 
FBP is able to answer these objections and is the best version of Platonism.  The main 
worry against Platonism, according to Balaguer, is that Platonism does not survive the 
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epistemic objections brought against it.  But, as we saw, knowledge without contact is 
possible as long as the knowledge to which we make reference is “consistent.”  Other 
versions of Platonism do not survive the epistemic challenge because the do not 
commit themselves to all logically possible objects.  The next section deals with 
fictionalism.  Fictionalism will have to answer to the questioning of FBP, and if it 
succeeds, we will have two defensible metaphysical views on the philosophy of 
mathematics.     
3.2b Mathematical Fictionalist (Anti-Platonism) 
 Fictionalism is a form of anti-realism.  That is, it states that all mathematical 
objects that are referred to in our mathematical theories are “fictions.”  Furthermore, 
there is no really a “number 3.”  When we speak of the “number 3” we use this term 
only as a manner of speaking.  The term “number 3” is a vacuous term.  When we use 
it, it is simply used at face value.109  Thus, fictionalism states that there aren’t any 
mathematical objects, and the terms like “3” are vacuous terms.110  Fictionalism states 
that statements like “3 is a prime number” can be accounted for in the ‘story of 
mathematics’ only.  Like FBP, fictionalism relies on the development of mathematics 
to provide it with a framework in which the “fictions” hold.  Like FBP, Fictionalists 
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must account for all the metaphysical worries about epistemology, and ontology of 
mathematics.   
 The main difference between anti-realists and realists (Platonists) is that anti-
realists agree that ‘facts’ about mathematical objects are “true” by invention—that is 
mathematicians are free to “construct” theories within certain limitations; Platonists 
agree that ‘facts’ about mathematical objects are true in some non-vacuous way, and 
those ‘facts’ are discovered.   
 Our next task is to see why fictionalism is the best version of Anti-Platonism.  
One of the main views in philosophy of mind is referred to as psychologism, where 
mental objects (ideas) are true as they are constructed by us.  These objects are mind 
dependent, so, if we all died, sentences like “2+2=4” would cease to exist (and 
become false) due to our deaths.111  This is the main problem with psychologism, 
because statements like “2+2=4” are mind dependent, we are only able to construct 
truth.  This is problematic if we want truth statements to be objective, independent of 
ideas created in the mind. 
 Another important view in the philosophy of mathematics that needs to be 
considered is realistic Anti-Platonism.  This type of Anti-Platonism is different than 
other forms like psychologism, and conventionalism in that these other theories are 
anti-realist.  According to Balaguer, realist anti-Platonism is famously attributed to 
John Stuart Mill.  This view states that mathematics is the most general of the natural 
sciences.  The truth of statements like “2+2=4” is accounted by us observing physical 
objects and intuitively seeing how when objects are lumped together, this gives us an 
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aggregate of objects—the ontology of mathematics under this view is strictly tied to 
physical objects.  Thus, 2 eggs, coupled with another 2 eggs, would give us 4 eggs.  
This type of Realist anti-Platonism ties the truths of mathematics to physical objects.  
One of the main and fatal objections to this theory is its inability to account for 
different configurations of sets.  Thus, this theory lacks the ability to account for the 
“stuffness” of objects.  Adding eggs to chairs is the exact same thing as adding eggs 
to eggs.  Thus, egg-stuff is commensurate with chair-stuff.  According to Balaguer, 
hierarchical mathematical theories like ZF set-theory are able to account for these 
differences, simply unavailable to John Stuart Mill’s form of realism.112 
 Truth’s like “2+2=4” according to Mill are arrived by our study of physical 
objects.  When we consider such sentences, it is objectionable that these sentences 
depend in any way to the relation of physical objects.  For Mill, it is possible to derive 
an entire system of axioms just from observing physical objects.  This is a bit of a 
stretch, because it requires the falsification of mathematical facts like “2+2=4” as a 
form of an empirical science.  That is, facts like “2+2=4” would depend on our 
observation, and empirical methods (however sophisticated or antiquated they might 
be).  Mill’s project concerns itself about physical objects in the world, leaving the 
“metaphysical objects” out.  Thus Mill thinks that we can arrive at a full description 
of the mathematical realm strictly from the physical world.  This places enormous 
pressure on empirical methods, their predictions, and how that affects the “truth” of 
scientific theories.  According to Mill, we are able come to truths based solely on our 
observation, and modeling of the physical world.  In the case of simply accounting for 
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physical objects, Mill’s project breaks down when dealing with large quantities (or 
extremely small ones as it is the case of quantum physics).  If we take the statement 
that “2+2=4,” we can derive the “truthness” of the statement by observing objects that 
indeed adding 2+2 we get 4.  When dealing with large quantities, we have a harder 
time gathering the objects, counting, and deriving the truth of the outcome.  For Mill, 
mathematics is a strictly empirical science.              
 Given all the problems that we have encountered, fictionalism can account for 
these because all that is said about our mathematical theories is not true.  All other 
theories, not only state that our mathematical theories are true, but these “truths” 
depend on mind (psychologism) or on physical objects (Mill’s scientific realism).   
 If we accept that fictionalism is the best form of anti-realist anti-platonism, 
our next worry is whether fictionalism can answer to the Frege’s indispensability 
argument.113  Thus, fictionalism would be false if it is not able to account for how our 
mathematical theories are indispensable to empirical science. 
  The main argument against fictionalism is Gottob Frege’s indispensability 
argument which states that: 
(i) the only way to account for the truth of our mathematical theories is to 
adopt Platonism  
 (ii) The only way to account for the fact that our mathematical theories are 
 applicable is and/or indispensable to empirical science is to admit that these 
 theories are true 
 Therefore,  
 (iii) Platonism is true and anti-Platonism is false.114 
                                                 
113
 Frege’s indispensability argument states that mathematical theories are true because they are 
indispensable to our empirical theories.   
 
114
 Ibid. pg. 95  Balaguer’s move is to proceed to attack (ii) by showing that mathematics is not 
indispensable to empirical science; furthermore, the fact that mathematics is applicable in an 
‘indispensable’ way can be accounted for without abandoning fictionalism (ibid pg. 96); Colyvan 
 47
 
It seems that Frege’s argument relies heavily on (ii) to try to refute all versions of 
anti-Platonism.  Balaguer shows that (ii) is false by stating that fictionalists can 
account for the ‘indispensability’ of mathematical theories in a similar manner to the 
FBPist.  The fictionalist can state that the ‘truth’ of our mathematical theories, in 
sentences like “2+2=4” is part of the standard story of mathematics whereas other 
sentences, like “2+2=5” are not part of the standard story of mathematics.115  There is 
another problem that arises for Platonists, as well for fictionalists.  Platonists are in 
trouble because they are unable to point to the relevant applications of mathematics to 
empirical science.  Balaguer’s example is that if mathematics provides us information 
about Mars and Charles Manson, it doesn’t provide us with what information is 
relevant about that particular relationship.  Platonists can account for relevant 
applications of mathematics to empirical sciences by using a representational account 
of mathematics in empirical science.  For, example, the way in which we use 
temperature depends on the real number line.  The relations between numbers 
(degrees) are the same as the relations between numbers in arithmetic.116  This is 
called a “representational account” of mathematics.  Now, although this is a simple 
example, we can talk about other examples in physics, chemistry, and biology.  The 
problem for Platonists is that this “representational account” will not account for all 
the applications in the empirical sciences.  Fictionalists are able to do the same 
                                                                                                                                           
(2001) presents a more detailed argument for the indispensability of mathematics, but comes to the 
same conclusion. 
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 Ibid. pg. 99 
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because they are able to call on a “representation” to refer to the characteristics of 
temperature.  This is called a representational mapping that is homomorphic to the 
relations of the empirical structure in question.117  Balaguer simply shows that there 
are only some indispensable mathematical theories for our empirical sciences, and 
that these indispensable mathematical theories can be nominalized118. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
117
 Ibid. pg. 112, a homomorphism refers to a structure that replaces another structure and is equivalent 
to that other structure in its function.   
 
118
 Ibid. Ch. 6, this chapter deals with the nominalization of Quantum Mechanics from a fictionalist 
point of view.  Because QM can be nominalized, it is possible to nominalize other empirical structures 
which require the aid of mathematics, the only thing that we say differently under fictionalism is that 
these structures are fictions.   
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4. Economic Methodology  
 
Section 3 dealt with providing a basic metaphysical framework of analysis in which 
mathematics is grounded.  This basic metaphysical framework serves as the 
foundation upon which “economics” can occur—specifically, mathematical 
economics.  With the rise of the mathematization of economics, it has been assumed 
that mathematics in general inherently has an indubitable logical foundation at its 
core.  At first glance, it seems that this is the case, mathematics, does seem to provide 
a foundation upon which the acquisition of knowledge occurs irrefutably.  The 
purpose of this section is to draw a correlation between the metaphysical foundations 
of mathematics, and its methodological implications in economics. 
 Kevin Hoover’s review of four seminal works in the methodology of 
economics rightly points out why methodology matters in economics.  This is 
precisely the title of his review.  In it, Hoover provides a realist defense of the new 
classical programme of research for economics.  This realist defense can be construed 
obviously in its platonic correlate.  The four main works reviewed in Hoover’s “Why 
does methodology matter for Economics” are Mark Blaug’s The Methodology of 
Economics: Or How Economists explain;  Daniel Hausman’s The Inexact and 
Separate Science of Economics; Alexander Rosenberg’s Economics: Mathematical 
Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns?; and Lawrence Boland’s The Principles 
of Economics: Some Lies my Teachers told me.  Blaug is characterized as a 
“falsificationalist” following the Popperian/Lakatosian tradition.119  Blaug’s 
definition of methodology (as quoted in Hoover) is: 
                                                 
 
 50
…a study of the relationship between theoretical concepts and warranted 
conclusions about the real world; in particular, methodology is that branch of 
economics where we examine the ways in which economists justify their 
theories and the reasons they offer for preferring one theory over another; 
methodology is both a descriptive discipline - "this is what most economists 
do" - and a prescriptive one - "this is what economists should do to advance 
economics"…120 
 
There is a good reason to start with Blaug’s definition of methodology.  We get a 
rough idea of why it might be good to understand the “behind the scenes” working to 
uphold economic theorizing and applications.   
 Hoover’s criticism of Rosenberg lies in portraying Rosenberg as merely 
philosophizing about economics, without generating a general critique about 
economics from particulars.121 
 According to Rosenberg, as rightly pointed out by Hoover’s review of 
Rosenberg (1992), economics belongs as a branch of applied mathematics.122  
Rosenberg’s critique of the current state of economics is its lack of progress between 
theorizing and predictability (two important components of a research programme – 
i.e. as seen in Newtonian mechanics).  Rosenberg’s attack on the current state of the 
economics enterprise123 is precisely directed at economics-as-mathematical-politics.  
According to Rosenberg, economists use mathematics as a tool to justify statements 
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 See Kevin Hoover, “Review: Why Does Methodology Matter for Economics?” Pg. 716 
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 Ibid. 
 
121
 Ibid. pg. 726 
 
122
 Ibid. 
 
123
 This might be a controversial way of bundling up neoclassical economics and its correlates.  Kevin 
Hoover demands that we do away with the term “neoclassical economics” and we rename it “New 
Classical Economics” in light of the “rational expectations” models in economics having to do with 
macroeconomic developments in the last century (for a detailed discussion see Ibid. pg. 729, and 
Hoover 1988, pg. 13). 
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about the economy which might not have very much merit.  Thus, Rosenberg states 
that the “intentions” of economists aren’t academic or scientific, but political.  In 
Rosenberg’s analysis, the “political” of economics can be characterized as an 
oligarchical dictatorship, where a set of economists have the only means 
(mathematics) by which economics is “properly done.” 
 Rosenberg compares economics to meteorology.  Hoover rightly points out 
that the state of technology in economics and meteorology have both improved, and 
therefore, Rosenberg’s critique and comparison do not hold—that is, it is not the case, 
as Rosenberg claims, that the economics enterprise fails completely to predict 
economic phenomena.  Economics doesn’t fail anymore than meteorology to predict 
the weather.  Hoover’s “refutation” of Rosenberg’s critique seems to lie in the fact 
that we have improved our method of collecting and predicting economic behavior.124   
 Rosenberg’s critique goes much deeper than meteorology.  A better way to 
critique Rosenberg’s critique of the economics enterprise would be the fact that 
Rosenberg states that the theory of supply & demand is analogous to Euclidean 
geometry. Rosenberg’s argument starts by stating that supply & demand are 
assertions about the economic space we observe.  Rosenberg then compares supply & 
demand to Euclidean geometry.  The last step is to show that Euclidean geometry is 
shown to be false given the developments in non-Euclidean geometry (mainly 
Einstein’s work on relativity which makes use of non-Euclidean geometry to show 
that the Euclidean view is actually false).125  According to Rosenberg, supply & 
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demand are “vacuous” as theoretical terms because they rely on something that has 
long been done away with in physics.  Given that Euclidean geometry is false, why is 
it that we use a false structure to describe the economic realm?  Our analysis in 
section 2 deals with arithmetic because it is the simplest (yet complicated) way to 
uncover the philosophical problems at hand.  Kevin Hoover skips over this part of 
Rosenberg’s critique, which is extremely valuable methodologically.  Hoover’s 
defense of the current economics enterprise is summarized with the following 
metaphor: it is better to have a house with a leaking roof, than no house at all.126 
   Hoover fails to capture Rosenberg’s deeper insight and its effect on 
economic methodology.  Rosenberg asserts that microeconomics (in which 
ultimately, game theory takes the front seat) is a ‘maximal theory.’  A ‘maximal 
theory’ seeks to “maximize” or “minimize” something within the theoretical 
framework.  In the case of neoclassical economics, analogously to Newtonian 
mechanics, Rosenberg states that the model of neoclassical economics behaves in a 
‘maximal’ way—the goal of the theoretical model is to “maximize” or “minimize” 
something.  It is in this spirit that the individual in neoclassical economics 
microeconomics is built.127   
 Evolutionary biology presents an interesting case of comparison, according to 
Rosenberg.  Evolutionary biology uses differential calculus to state that organisms 
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 See Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, 
pp. 239-241. 
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 We shall come back to this claim in later sections (this connection will be made explicit with 
regards to competing theories which do not take mathematics unqualifyingly (i.e. “innocuous 
falsificationism”) as a foundational methodological device). 
 
127
 See Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, 
pp. 230-232, Neoclassical economics seeks to explain individual behavior this dual simplistic manner.  
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maximize “fitness.”  It is arguably the case that the use of a “maximal” theory fits 
evolutionary biology better than economics given that evolutionary biology does not 
make any claims about individual organisms behaving in a certain manner linked to 
mathematical formulations.128  In this light, Rosenberg’s critique can bear some 
fruitful conversation about economics.  Hoover’s simplistic “refutation” of Rosenberg 
seems to miss this point.129  Thus, Rosenberg’s insight about neoclassical economics, 
specifically game theory, is that it might not be as fruitful to apply principles of 
differential calculus to economics as these methods are applied in natural systems 
(physics, or biology).130  Rosenberg points out that the success of evolutionary 
biology and physics do not give methodological credence to economics.131     
 Kevin Hoover’s review proceeds with Mark Blaug’s book The Methodology 
of Economics, or how Economists Explain.  Hoover characterizes Blaug’s 
methodology as belonging to the Lakatosian/Popperian tradition of “falsificationism.”  
Falsificationism sets out to test hypotheses about scientific phenomena (and of 
course, economic phenomena as well).132  Thus, Blaug’s concern as a 
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 It seems that Rosenberg points in the direction that propels this project.  Rosenberg’s seems to look 
comparatively at other systems in the sciences methodologically analogous (b/c of the use of 
differential calculus) in order to critique how economics as a discipline might hold up against these 
other theories with the use of the same tools—differential calculus in mathematics. 
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 In Neoclassical economics, then people, are captured at the same level of mathematical algorithms, 
which could describe perfectly well a system of nature.  This point will become important when 
defining “individuality” with respect to intentionality.  As we have seen, the game-theoretical assertion 
is that a general-equilibrium-evolutionary-biology-like maximal behavior exists in economic agents. 
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 See Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, 
pg. 234. 
 
132
 See Kevin Hoover, “Review: Why Does Methodology Matter for Economics?” Pg. 724. 
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“falsificationist” is that the economics enterprise does not “properly” test its 
theories—Blaug calls current economic theorizing “innocuous falsificationism.”  
According to Hoover, Blaug’s worry as a “falsificationist” is misplaced because one 
can only hope for “innocuous falsificationism.”133 
 Blaug’s Ch. 3 presents verificationism as prehistory of methodology of 
economics.  Verificationism deals with a priori truths and how to verify them.  What 
is interesting about verificationism is that there is inherently no attempt to work out a 
“methodology” in order to formulate hypotheses.134  Verificationism assumes that 
theory of choice is true (by assumption), and the task of the researcher is to “verify” 
that the theory is true.  According to Blaug, Adam Smith’s case is of most importance 
for economics. Adam Smith attempts to give a version of verificationism especially in 
The Wealth of Nations.135 
 Another important figure in the history of economics is John Stuart Mill.  John 
Stuart Mill’s 1836 essay On the Definition of Political Economy which begins with a 
definition of economic man.  According to John Stuart Mill, referring to the economic 
man as a whole would require a lot, and basically, economic man is too complicated.  
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 This is in connection with the leaking roof metaphor provided by Hoover. 
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 See Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics, or how Economists Explain, pg. 52, among these 
early political economists are Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus.  Blaug’s point is that 
a priori truths were taken to be obvious enough not to have to state them explicitly.  This is certainly 
the case in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.  Smith is a particularly interesting case because he 
does have an essay that is methodological on the philosophy of science—The Principles which Lead 
and Direct Philosophical Inquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy which deals Smith’s 
epistemology through Newton’s Principia:  ‘certain principles, primary or proved, in the beginning, 
from whence we account for the several phenomena, connecting all together by the same chain’ (as 
quoted in Blaug, ibid. pg. 52). 
 
135
 Ibid. it is not coincidental that Smith has ties to Newton, and ultimately to the Kantian tradition.  
What is important to notice is the call of the a priori as a precondition for the methodology of 
economics by Smith. 
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Thus, John Stuart Mill suggests creating a “fictional” economic man—where the 
purpose of economic analysis (then political economy proper) is to get at the basics of 
this “fictional” economic man.  Mill’s methodological move to construct a “fictional” 
economic man allows us to analyze the way in which the “fictional” economic man’s 
goals are to maximize wealth with as little sacrifice as possible.136  Mill thus calls for 
an a priori method tied to verificationism.  Maximizing wealth is not a “fact” we can 
verify.  Insofar as the science of political economy goes, it fails to prove what we 
hypothesize as the behavior of the “fictional” economic man if we try to apply it to 
real world situations.  The solution to this problem is that we should seek to verify 
our theories about our “fictional” economic man.  Mill calls for a priori statements, 
which are then corroborated by a posteriori statements which are supposed to be the 
result of “philosophical investigation”—this very process of investigation is deemed 
verificationism.  That is, we shouldn’t try to falsify our economic theories.  It is rather 
a method of verification that we should seek to verify our assertions made before any 
investigation is done (a priori).137  Mark Blaug points out that this type of 
verificationism leads Mill to limit his analysis to “tendency laws.”  These tendency 
laws are what are at the bottom of the phenomena we observe in the world (whether 
in physics or economics).  The importance in mentioning physics or other sciences for 
Mill, is that it is clear for Mill that there exist “Laws” for which we can apply the a 
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 Ibid. pg. 57 Mill’s example (in a passage quoted by Blaug) is friction in mechanics.  Mill sees that 
we observe friction in the world.  Our next step is to assert an a priori statement, we then observe 
something in the world that verifies our assertion (neither Mill nor Blaug state this but this is Mill’s 
version of acquiring scientific knowledge).  
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priori/a posteriori formulation.  This formulation ‘comes into its own, not as a way of 
discovering truth, but as a way of verifying it’.138 
 What is important about this is the lineage in methodology that is clearly 
represented by ceteris paribus statements widely used in economics today.     
As Blaug states:   
[a] tendency statement in economics can be regarded, therefore, as a 
promissory note that is only redeemed when the ceteris paribus clause has 
been spelled out and taken into account, preferably in quantitative terms139     
 
Furthermore, Blaug states that ceteris paribus statements are a “sort of catchall” 
statements for all that is unknown.  In comparison to the physical sciences (physics, 
chemistry, biology), ceteris paribus statements are used in a restrictive sense which 
does not encompass the whole of the theory at hand.140  Blaug further states that 
unless there is a restriction placed on these ceteris paribus clauses (the restriction 
amounts to “disturbances” on the system being analyzed), they are useless as attempts 
to blanket other “causes” in the analysis that is being carried out.  
 John Stuart Mill was aware of some of these issues which he tried to address 
in his System of Logic (1843).  Mill’s system of logic tries to “demolish” Kant’s 
foundational epistemology (that is how synthetic a priori statements can come to 
be).141  Blaug’s analysis of Mill’s Logic renders Mill as an important figure in the 
philosophy of science, but rather than to label Mill’s Logic as a theoretical account of 
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logic, Blaug wants to label it “an analysis of the scientific method relating to the 
evaluation of evidence.”  Mill’s contributions to economics, in his Logic deal with the 
way in which logical induction is made.  Mill’s canons of induction are “a set of non-
demonstrable rules of confirmation.”  Mill tries to solve Hume’s problem of induction 
using his four methods of agreement. 142  Blaug further points out that Mill’s 
indiscriminate use of the term induction “largely spoils” the rest of the Logic.143   
 Ultimately, Mill’s “logic” neither solves Hume’s induction problem, nor even 
attempts to “defeat” Kant’s epistemology.  Mill neither succeeds in stating how it is 
possible that we acquire knowledge following Kant’s project; or how we go from 
impressions to knowledge following Hume’s challenge to Kant.  Instead Mill takes 
over Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism.144  Bentham’s utilitarianism is founded on 
methodological individualism (that is, economic agents are atomic units in the 
economy).  Mill’s ultimate goal was to provide the methodological foundation for the 
social sciences in general.  Mill did not call for a “descriptive” type of 
methodological individualism which attempts to describe how economic agents truly 
are in their “atomic” state.  Mill attempts to develop a normative account the 
economy, and economic agents (in terms of methodological individualism).  Blaug 
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phenomena by presupposing a system of nature from which we can draw causal connections.  On 
Mill’s four methods of agreement, see Ibid. note 10. 
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methodology of science must take most of the blame…’   
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states, “[e]ven those who are most sympathetic to Mill’s economics agree that he was 
at best a lukewarm verificationist.”145 
 In the section on verificationism, Blaug has one last segment on modern 
Austrians, among whom the notable are Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek.  The 
case of Mises is of particular interest because of the poignant assertion that he is on 
Kantian ground.  Ludwig von Mises was against any form of verificationism, or 
empiricism which looked anything like scientific research which had been taking 
place in the tradition of Mill among others.  Von Mises central claim was that all 
human intentions were based on an underlying purpose (which is formulated in a 
radical mode of a priorism).146  What is important to notice about the modern 
Austrians, especially von Mises is his reluctance to give in to the temptation of 
indiscriminate use of mathematics in economics. 
 Von Mises wants to follow Kant in his “synthetic a priori” method.  Von 
Mises, however, falls short in his critique of the use of mathematics in economics.  
Von Mises thinks that mathematics is at the root of the problem in economic theory.  
Mathematics, as argued by Kant (section 2 above) is supposed to be the foundation of 
knowledge, and science.  Thus, economists will agree that mathematics makes the 
analysis clearer by putting all the assumptions about the specific model on the table 
(whether economists think about the implications about the use of mathematics is a 
different story).  Von Mises misses Kant’s point in the Prolegomena with respect to 
the intimate connection between science, mathematics, and epistemology.  The whole 
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of Kant’s project is due to this connection.  Just referring to terms such as “synthetic a 
priori” and the like without any regard to Kant’s original insight is misguided.147     
 Following the prehistory of methodology, Blaug gives an account of the 
methodology of economics in the 20th century.  Many of the developments seem to be 
a continuation of Mill’s project stemming from his Logic and his seminal essay On 
the Definition of Political Economy.  As one of my professors used to say when 
teaching us advanced micro-economics: “it’s the same story, I just ramp-up the 
math!”  The same story goes for the methodology of economics, as mathematical 
techniques in economics become more sophisticated, the importance to maintain an 
eye towards ontological problems get’s even more hushed up.    
 The main methodological techniques of the 20th century take several forms of 
falsificationism (this is to be differentiated to the rigorous falsificationism for which 
Blaug calls). 
 Paul Samuelson’s 1949 The Operational Significance of Economic Theory 
brings the research programme of “Operationalism.”  Operationalism, according to 
Samuelson, deals with deriving ‘operationally meaningful theorems.’ A meaningful 
theorem, according to Samuelson, is ‘simply a hypothesis about empirical data which 
could conceivably be refuted if under ideal conditions.’148  Blaug analysis of 
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 Ibid. pg. 87 Blaug notes that this formulation differs from the Operationalism in the Philosophy of 
Science laid down by Percy Bridgeman’s The Nature of Physical Theory (1936) which deals with 
connecting “abstract concepts physical theory to the experimental operations of concrete physical 
measurement (ibid. pg. 88).”  For another important statement similarly made in economics is Alan 
Gibbard and Hal Varian’s “Economic Models” which states that capturing reality whole is an 
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Samuelson’s “Operationalism” in particular is that it is undermined by the lack of 
clarity to specify a more fundamental mode of falsification—Blaug’s characterization 
of Operationalism (at least Samuelson’s brand) is to say that it is merely empirical.149 
 Samuelson’s attempt to formulate a clear project for economists seems to fail 
in clarifying exactly the relationship between the theory and the falsification that is to 
take place given the theory at hand.150  The whole of Samuelson’s project is to study 
economic phenomena as they appear in the world by way of positing the economic 
phenomena’s dynamic stability, then via “causal empiricism,” provide proof of the 
economic phenomena as it actually is through the model that is posited.  Samuelson’s 
project aims at formulating a theory in a “realistic” manner.  That is, a theory which 
deals with connecting the “real world” to the economic theories at issue.151      
 Milton Friedman’s seminal “Essay on the Methodology of Positive 
Economics” (1953) comes precisely to the aid of aspiring economists.  Although it is 
difficult to discern what Friedman “really” meant in this essay with regards to 
“positive economics” Blaug’s statement about the essay will do for now.152  The main 
                                                                                                                                           
impossibility, thus, we must use “caricatures” (models) that are essentially (instrumental) to our 
economic theories (pp. 665-666).     
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 Uskali Mäki’s (forthcoming) “Reading the methodological essay in twentieth century economics: 
Map of multiple perspectives” makes this point rather clearly stating that unrealistic assumptions need 
not be a detriment to a scientific theory.  Mäki’s stance, however, is at the margin in terms of its 
interpretation of Friedman’s essay.  That is, Mäki is interested in seeing how Friedman’s essay could 
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statement for Friedman’s 1953 essay is the “irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis.”  This 
thesis states that the assumptions on which a theory is grounded (that is, the set of 
axioms which lie in support of the theory at hand) do not matter as long as the theory 
has explanatory power. A theory’s explanatory power is how well the theory is 
“confirmed” by experience.153 The term “Unrealistic” is to be stripped of any 
metaphysical connotation.  “Unrealistic” simply means the way in which the 
hypothesis, and its assumptions are able to incorporate (and explain) the economic 
variables that the hypothesis is trying to explain in the world.  Friedman rightly points 
out that the whole of scientific analysis is full of such “unrealistic assumptions.”  This 
point is worth exploring in a bit of detail.  The example that comes under analysis is 
the perfect competition/monopolistic competition framework, and maximization of 
profit in economics.  According to Friedman, when we assume that there is perfect 
competition in the (actual) market place, and that businessmen seek to maximize 
profits, we are merely stating “abstracting from reality.”  Abstracting from reality 
refers to the use of economic models in order to analyze what truly is going in the 
economy.  According to Friedman, whether these assumptions are “realistic” has no 
bearing on our theory (that economic agents seek to maximize profit, and that the 
structure under which this maximization takes place is perfect competition).  The 
Darwinian process of rivalry will assure that the agents who actually maximize will 
                                                                                                                                           
fit in a framework of scientific realism (how scientific phenomena behave under an objective 
structure).  Mäki’s analysis allows us to move beyond the segmented and, thus far unclear account of 
economic methodology.    
 
153
 Ibid. pg. 91, this formulation is what comes to be called the F-twist.  The extreme form of the F-
twist is expressed in Friedman’s essay as: ‘to be important…a hypothesis must be descriptively false in 
its assumptions.’  
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survive.154  Friedman’s “methodology” even goes further than this.  Blaug calls into 
question the way in which assumptions might be used to support (formulate) a 
hypothesis:  
1) statements of motivation such as utility and profit maximization; 2) 
statements of overt behavior of economic agents; 3) statements of 
functionality and stability of certain functional relationships; 4) restrictions on 
the range of variables taken into account; and 5) boundary conditions under 
which the theory is held to apply.155 
 
The methodological way in specifying each of these assumptions is not 
straightforward.  One has to really look at the issues at hand (for which assumption 3 
is useful).  The purpose of these “assumptions,” according to Friedman, is to allow 
economists a ground upon which they conduct their research without having to make 
any methodological claims.  Milton Friedman’s “irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis” 
merely ignores any need to deal with such questions—ultimately what this leads to 
treating business firms as “black boxes” from which all theorizing and hypothesizing 
takes place.  This framework, allows for the theories about maximizing agents and 
perfect competition to be “unfalsifiable;” unfalsifiable theories are not subject to 
questioning, or disproof, they are simply working frameworks that can never be 
debunked.156 
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 Kevin Hoover’s “Why does methodology matter for Economics,” seems to 
agree with Mark Blaug’s characterization of present day mainstream economics as a 
field that practices “innocuous falsificationism.”157  As stated above, 
“falsificationism” deals with empirical “testing” regarding economics (or any other 
type) theories in order to determine which theory is better.  By “better,” we mean to 
say that the theory explains the behavior of the phenomena which the theory intends 
to describe.  Hoover’s assertion about economics is that “innocuous falsificationism” 
is the best thing for which we can hope.  If we are to be “innocuous” about debunking 
our economic theories, our intent regarding economic theories in general is not to 
debunk those theories but gather data which “fits” those theories (e.g. Rosengberg’s 
charge on economics being mere “curve fitting.”)  Hoover, however, does not take 
into account Rosenberg’s critique of mathematical economics as it relates to 
connecting theory with the world—a story clearly corroborated by Blaug’s account of 
the methodology of economics culminating in Friedman’s 1953 essay. 
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5. NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS (OR SOME DERIVATIVE THEREOF) 
 
 Section 4 dealt with giving a brief account of the methodology of economics, 
it seems that one can draw a well defined (almost unchanged) line from the time of 
Mill up until the time of Friedman’s 1953 essay.  This section deals with the question 
about mainstream economics from a historical perspective, its lack of change, and its 
implementation of mathematics as a theoretical grounding. 
 5.1 Neoclassical Economics Defined 
 
Neoclassical economics comes directly from Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism 
found in the Principles of Morals and Legislation.  Secondly, Neoclassical economics 
is also directly linked to Locke’s An Essay on Human Understanding.  Although the 
nomenclature changes, the basic framework for economic methodology slightly 
changes to accommodate a strand of utility theory advanced by Bentham. The study 
of economics remains, in neoclassical economics, as the study of a natural system.158  
The evolution of economic theorizing has led us to rely on the mathematization of 
economic theory.  As we saw in section 2, Kant’s project sets out to ground 
knowledge in general, and particularly in science via mathematics.  Thus, we have a 
good argument why this mathematization occurs.  Almost two centuries later, Milton 
Friedman’s Essays in Positive Economics sets out to derive a “value-free” economic 
methodology, and what a better way to do this than through mathematics.159  This 
section revisits neoclassical economics to its past.  In doing so, we see that this has 
specific implications for economic methodology. 
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 Locke provides the perfect human psychology on which neoclassical 
economists are able to build models.  The Lockean view deals with the inner 
subjectivity of individuals.  This inner subjectivity is disentangled from the world.160  
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations synthesizes the chaotic view of the individual (as in 
Hobbes) with the Lockean (more coherent) view.  The Wealth of Nations does this by 
calling upon an invisible hand.  Individual subjectivities come together in the market 
place, and through the aid of the invisible hand of the market, form a continuous 
social whole.  Smith simply continues Locke’s idea about individual subjectivity 
through his formulation of competitive individuals in the market.161  Furthermore, for 
Smith, the interaction of competitive individuals in the market reveals an underlying 
psychology about individuals.  Smith did not directly engage in trying to investigate 
behavior by individuals in specific settings (rather, the market arises as a natural 
system from the behavior of individuals and individuals’ self-interest).162  For Smith, 
self-interest creates social cohesion by creating interdependent economic relations 
among individuals.   
 John Davis characterization of Adam Smith is what Davis calls Scottish 
Enlightenment Dualism.  Dualism refers to “mental states,” and their correspondence 
with “activity” and objects in the world.  Dualism has an underlying type of 
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metaphysics which seeks to point to every “correspondence” between what goes on in 
the brain, and phenomena in the world.  That is, every act, and every object is linked 
to thoughts.  Dualism does not provide a way to distinguish imaginary objects from 
“real” ones.  This Locke/Smith formulation of the individual is taken up by 
neoclassical economists.163    
Neoclassical economists ignore any type of reference to philosophy, which would not 
only help economics deal with these types of problems, but also construct better 
theoretical models. 
 Neoclassical economics takes after Adam Smith but rejects everything but the 
way in which the market mechanism works.  John Davis summarizes the neoclassical 
argument as follows: 
1) Individuals are unique among all possible units of analysis in economic 
life because their behavior alone can be understood in terms of choice. 
2) Choice can only be explained in reference to individuals’ inner states, that 
is, their private tastes and desires, because this is the basis on which 
individuals discriminate among their options. 
3) Individuals discriminate among their options because they apply 
marginalist principles. 
4) Marginalist principles explain markets because they account for the 
determination of prices164  
 
Any further development of mainstream economic theory resembles this formulation.  
Davis’ characterization of neoclassical economics allows us to make explicit two 
points which are carried through the rest of our analysis of game theory (defined 
below).  First, individuals are independent of their environment.  Second, everything 
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is explained by choices made by individuals in the economy.  Using choice as a mode 
of analysis for the economy, neoclassical economists “solve” any problems dealing 
with the psychology of individuals.  Neoclassical economics is “rigorously” defended 
with the rise of game theory.  With the development of game theory, the attempt to 
solve problems about the economy given the complexity of individuals is merely 
reworded more sophisticated jargon, but the same neoclassical statements about 
individuals and the economy.    
5.2 Evolution in Terminology, not in Economic Theory 
 One of the main platforms for neoclassical economics is the reduction of the 
individual to a maximizing agent.  The main assumption about individuals in general 
is that they are “rational” with respect to their actions.  This means that they follow 
the best set of actions which will best satisfy the agent’s ends.165  Individuals have 
‘objective functions’ which they maximize.166 
 The nineteenth century saw the rise of neoclassical marginalism.  Among the 
distinguished economists are Gossens, Jevons, Menger, Walras and Marshall.  These 
economists held that the “individual’s objectives are associated with the psychology 
of wants and desires.”167  John Davis states that the formulation of the individual does 
not change from Jeremy Bentham’s formulation of the individual basically ruled by 
pain and pleasure.  Neoclassical marginalism sought to take the individual’s 
                                                 
 
165
 Ibid. pg. 27, Davis notes that the theory of choice is agnostic about the ends of choices (we will see 
that this is a direct consequence of the incommensurability of value under a purely subjectivist internal 
theory of the individual). 
 
166
 Ibid. pg. 27, Here Davis points out that the ‘objective function’ formulation is supposed to signal a 
departure away from the Lockean subjectivist view to the Newtonian object world. 
 
167
 Ibid. pg. 27 
 68
“psychology” further by attributing a measurement—this theory receives the name of 
“cardinal utility theory.”  Cardinal utility theory states that everything can be 
measured quantitatively.  The primary influence of this idea is Jeremy Bentham’s 
Principles of Morals and Legislation.   
 For Bentham, human psychology was subject to the sovereign masters of pain 
and pleasure.168  Individuals are under the rule of these “masters,” and perform a 
calculus which seeks pleasure and avoids pain.169  The calculus of pain and pleasure 
was an actual calculation, according to Bentham, to decide what course of action 
would be better depending on the amount of pleasure produced.  For Bentham, as 
well for the early marginalists in the nineteenth century, this calculus was cardinal—
that is, possible to measure as a quantity, such as weight and height.170  Thus, 
neoclassical economics, in its early development resembles Bentham’s cardinal 
utilitarianism.171  The 20th century saw a different development in utility theory.  The 
focus now was shifted to the ordinality of preferences—ordinal utility theory.  
Economists very quickly realized that utility was in fact not like weight or height.         
 According to Davis, Pareto (1979 [1909])172 made the first step towards 
distancing economic theorizing from human psychology.  Pareto’s formulation is in 
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terms of individuals’ preference173 combinations.  For Pareto, and this development 
of neoclassical economics, rank ordering has nothing in particular in reference to 
individual psychology.   The key to this type of analysis arrives at preferences from 
individuals that are “revealed” from individuals’ choices.174   
 Hicks and Allen (1934)175 develop Pareto’s ordinal utility framework into 
indifference curves.176  Robins (1935 [1932], 1938) goes as far as to make 
interpersonal comparisons of utility among economic agents (which lead to policy 
recommendations).177  Davis points out that these particular statements of utility and 
the individual are part of what Davis calls “emotivist ethics.”  Emotivist ethics sets 
out to describe ethical judgments in terms of individuals’ emotions or attitudes.178  If 
we look at the case of either the Benthamite formulation of “human nature” with 
respect to what ought to be done ethically, we see that Bentham emphasizes quite 
clearly that ethical judgments are derived from “objective” concepts—pleasure and 
pain.  This is not the case with the later formulations of utility.  The naturalistic 
framework with which Bentham develops his utilitarianism seeks to arrive at ethical 
judgments from objective natural states (pleasure and pain).  The nineteenth century 
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development of ordinal utility complicates the Benthamite formulation by asserting 
that ethical judgments come from individuals’ emotions or attitudes.  Thus, there is a 
shift from “nature,” in Bentham, and the subjective emotions and attitudes of 
individuals.179  If we are to derive ethical judgments from individuals’ attitudes or 
emotions, we are only left with individuals’ judgments about ethics and the economy.  
If we are to derive any objective framework which does not depend on the subjective 
attitudes of individuals, it is only through reference to that objective framework that 
we can arrive at doing so (see section 6.3 below).  However, if we only state that 
individuals have subjective attitudes towards the ethical or economic realm, we are 
left with just those subjective attitudes towards the economic or ethical realms, 
without attempting to discern what the actual economic or ethical realm. 180    
 The 20th century is the story of Paul Samuelson and “revealed preferences.”  
Paul Samuelson undermines utility theory and moves away to revealed and axiomatic 
preferences.  Samuelson’s project is to have a theory of choice that does away with 
any reference to psychology and individual subjectivity (Samuelson 1938).  
Preferences do not dictate individual choices.  Instead, choices “reveal” an 
individual’s preferences (Samuelson 1948).181  Paul Samuelson’s project was to 
model economic theory to make it as “scientific” as possible by using models from 
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thermodynamics.182  Samuelson’s influenced economics by restating the utility in 
terms of choice formally—that is mathematically.  In “Some Psychological Aspects 
of Mathematics and Economics” Samuelson provides an argument for the complete 
mathematization of economics.  He divides the “literal” economists from the 
mathematical economists.  This division, he admits, is an arbitrary one.  What 
Samuelson states is that it is possible to reduce economics to formal mathematics.183  
Samuelson’s call for the non-mathematician is to become one.184 
 As Davis clearly points out, the critique of neoclassical economics does not 
stick because they are “not trying to explain human psychology.”  Instead their aim is 
to explain human choice.  But in order to do this neoclassical economists resort need 
to start with economic agents and their exogenous preferences.185 
 Since neoclassical economics must be purely formal, they resort to 
“methodological individualism” to accomplish this.  This, according to Davis, is the 
“last ditch defense” for neoclassical economics.  The mathematization of economics 
gives rise to “methodological individualism” (where economic agents are 
homogeneous atomic agents).186  What follows from this is that reductionism takes 
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place.  Reductionism, in philosophy of science, states that if a theory can be explained 
by a simpler (more fundamental) theory, than the larger theory can be reduced to the 
simpler theory.187  The criterion for reductionism is to translate the less fundamental 
theory into the simpler theory (via “bridge laws”).  Secondly, all explanations in the 
less fundamental theory must be translated to the simpler, thus eliminating the 
unnecessary elements from the less fundamental theory, in order to express 
everything in terms of the simpler theory.188   
 New Classical Economics189 (differentiated from neoclassical) is an attempt to 
be the ultimate defense of neoclassical economics by resorting to general equilibrium 
models.  New Classical Economics stems is based on modeling general equilibrium in 
the economy based on individual preferences, endowments and technology.  The well 
known Debreu-Arrow-McKensie general equilibrium model attempts to explain 
individual preferences, endowments, and technology (in the aggregate) via 
fluctuations in unemployment.190  Davis concludes that these models make “global” 
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assumptions that are critical for the models, which cannot be derived from individual 
behavior.191  
 Davis’ critique of the various derivations of neoclassical economics seems to 
be a core critique in philosophy of science.  Davis presents an array of economic 
views which deal with the main line of economic thought to date.  Davis concludes 
that the way in which economics is done by neoclassical economics overlooks 
questions about the nature of the individual and the economy.  However harsh Davis’ 
critique might seem to neoclassical economists, Roy Weintraub thinks that 
economists in general do not need to philosophy of science.  Philosophy of science 
deals with the philosophical commitments and statements of scientific theories.  
Weintraub thinks that this type of analysis is at a level too high to have impact in 
economics’ practice.192  That is, economists should worry about the practical aspects 
of economics.  “Philosophical questions” should be left to philosophers of science 
and methodologists.  For Weintraub takes methodologists to have little to do with the 
“inside” economic practice.  Weintraub’s main targets are Alexander Rosenberg and 
Donald McCloskey.  Rosenberg is seen as a mere “Methodologist.”  Weintraub takes 
Rosenberg’s critique of Neoclassical economics (among other brands of economic 
theory)193 to be mere “metatheorizing.”  Rosenberg’s critique of neoclassical 
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economics starts from the fact that neoclassical economics has not produced the same 
empirical results as biology or physics.  These “results” are in terms of predictability 
of the phenomena that each of these is trying to explain.  Since neoclassical 
economics fails to bring about the same results empirically, Rosenberg questions the 
credibility of neoclassical economics.194   
 McCloskey on the other hand, in The Rhetoric of Economics, argues that 
economics need not concern itself with epistemic problems (problems about how we 
acquire knowledge in general).  McCloskey’s argument is that all that matters is the 
“art of argument,” and discussion which might arise from economics as a discipline.  
Weintraub states that both Rosenberg and McCloskey are simply “wrong.”  
Weintraub comes to the defense of everyday economists (economists in practice) and 
states that any criticism by a philosopher of science lies “outside” of economics.195  
Thus, according to Weintraub, the work of philosophers of science is redundant and 
has no practical impact for everyday economists.  Weintraub’s defense of neoclassical 
economists (among the rest) lies precisely here.  The outsider’s perspective cannot 
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permit philosophers of science to impact the methodology of everyday economists.  It 
is clear that Weintraub thinks that economists stick pretty close to the ground (in 
terms of metaphysics), thus they are “safe” from any “metatheorizing.”  But, it is 
arguably the case that economists in general, including neoclassical economists make 
metaphysical claims without knowing.  Even when these metaphysical claims are 
known, the metaphysical claims are narrow and at times implausible.  Metaphysical 
claims by everyday economists take the form of “models” and these models should be 
analyzed thoroughly.196  
5.3 Game Theory, Intentionality, & Welfare 
 
Game theory has its inception in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern stem their analysis 
of the individual agent from better wanting to understand the behavior of oligopolistic 
and monopolistic firms.  From their analysis of these types of firms, von Neumann 
and Morgenstern state that individual economic agents are “bearers of strategies.”  
Treating individuals as bearers of strategies gave way to another explanation of 
individual behavior, “supraindividual” institutions, convention and social rules. 197  In 
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the tradition of Walrasian equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium is the outcome of the 
aggregate of strategies by individuals in the economy.198    
 John B. Davis duly asks if individuals considered as “bearers of strategies” do 
any better in explaining the individual, and whether avoids the problems in 
neoclassical economics.  The first problem we encounter is with respect to “being a 
bearer of strategies.”  Davis points out that this characterization of the individual 
allows for a non-exclusive relation between the individual and the strategies.  That is, 
rather than to specify a particular type of rational individual who will act in the 
economy in a certain psychological way, the “bearer of strategy” definition of the 
individual is not to be tied to any particular type of psychological behavior.199  Thus, 
Davis concludes that this game theoretic characterization of the individual rejects 
Locke’s conception of the individual as possessing a subjective inwardness.200  A 
consequence of the game theoretic formulation of strategies allows game theorists not 
to give explanations as to why a player might pursue one strategy over another— 
 Game theorists do not say because players have such-and-such type strategies, 
 games will have certain outcomes.  They ask, should players have such-and-
 such types of strategy, what outcomes might games have?201  
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This game theoretic formulation ultimately shows the ongoing agnosticism by 
neoclassical economists about any normative claim—and thus, by remaining in the 
“descriptive” realm, they “avoid” value-laden claims. 
 The problem of reductionism, according to Davis, remains in game theory.  
Reductionism refers to how theories might be “reduced” to simpler, more compact 
theories.  The “bearer of strategy” formulation is an atomist-holist equilibrium 
analysis.  Rather than to present an account of economic agents in connection to 
social institutions, conventions, and social rules, the game theoretic formulation 
assumes this connection.  Game theorists depend on “consistent alignment of beliefs” 
(CAB) and common knowledge rationality (CKN).202  What follows from CAB and 
CKN is that individuals with the same information prior to any game will come to the 
same conclusion.203  In order to simplify the problem, consistent alignment of beliefs 
and common knowledge rationality must be asserted.  Common alignment of beliefs 
states that agents will not have conflicting beliefs about anything; whereas common 
knowledge rationality states that when it comes to knowledge that is imposed on 
economic agents, the reaction of agents in relation to that knowledge would be the 
same.  If agents interact with social institutions for example, these social institutions 
will have the same impact on economic agents because they all have “common 
knowledge” about these social institutions.  Common knowledge is regarded as 
something that is known to all the economic agents.  If economic agents act against 
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this “common knowledge,” then the particular action of the agent is considered 
“irrational.”  Davis points out that the common knowledge rationality would follow 
nicely from having to deal with social institutions if individuals were actually as they 
are described in game theory.204  Common alignment of beliefs is harder to imagine 
without a social foundation of some sort.  Rather, game theorists stick to their 
individualistic “strategy bearing” agent models.205 
 John B. Davis provides an account of game theory at its general level, and 
although we get a general idea of what problems might arise, Davis’ project has taken 
us far enough.  Alexander Rosenberg206 provides a more detailed account of game 
theory and rational choice.  Prediction makes a science exact, and increase in 
prediction increases the accuracy of a science.  In the case of economics, since it is 
dealing with human choice, it is harder to come to prediction as it is the case in 
physics and biology.  Rational choice theory is the main founding block of game 
theory (and arguably neoclassical economics).  Rational choice theory (in addition to 
what has been discussed above) as it is formalized in game theory deals with the 
choices of economic agents.  Rosenberg, (as many others) points out that the idea that 
agents are “rational” is suspect.  Rosenberg’s conclusion is that economic agents are 
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in fact irrational.207  This is but the start of the line of problems that plague rational 
choice theory.           
 Daniel Hausman’s The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics presents 
the rational choice theory and its basic foundations—utility maximization, the weak 
axiom of revealed preference (WARP), and rationality and uncertainty: expected 
utility theory.208   
 It is said that economic agents maximize utility (an economic agent’s index of 
preferences).  As Hausman, states, to state that agents “maximize utility” is to state 
nothing about the agent’s preferences.  All that this means is that we can connect an 
agent’s preferences with choices—“Rational individuals rank available alternatives 
and choose what they most prefer.”209  Thus, the working framework for rational 
choice theory is: 
 [agent] A’s preferences are rational if and only if: 
(1) A’s preferences are complete, 
(2) A’s preferences are transitive, and 
(3) A’s preferences are continuous.  
An agent’s A’s choices are rational if and only if: 
(1) A’s preferences are rational and 
(2) A prefers no option to the one A chooses210  
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Hausman states that rational choice theory is a normative theory (despite attempts by 
some to unqualifyingly deem it descriptive because of its mathematical rigor)—“[t]o 
define what rational choice and preference are, is ipso facto to say how one ought 
rationally to prefer and to choose.”211  Hausman further states that rational choice 
theory may be taken as “positive.”  Even when rational choice theory is “positive,” 
one still has the limitation of rationality as defined by rational choice theory.  The 
level of generality of these preferences not only speaks to economic activity, but 
psychology as well.   
 Samuelson’s 1938 “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Choice” 
attempts to formulate a completely positive account of rational choice theory, but 
instead of rationality, revealed preferences take center stage.  In order not to rely on 
preferences and choices, revealed-preference theory comes in the picture (as already 
mentioned above, this takes our attention away from the actual agent and shifts it to 
his preferences that are “revealed.”  The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) 
serves as the foundation for revealed-preference theory. 
 The WARP indicates that if it is revealed that agent A prefers x to y, then it 
will always be revealed that x is preferred to y.  Thus, the conclusion to be drawn 
from WARP is that if x is revealed to be preferred to y, then agent A must always 
choose x over y.212  The obvious problems for this are pointed out by (Sen 1977) 
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where an agent might choose something that the agent does not prefer; or the agent’s 
preferences might have changed altogether (Hirschman 1985).213 
 As if these problems aren’t enough, Hausman points out that revealed-
preference theory faces four further serious objections.  (Harsanyi 1977) shows that if 
agent A chooses x when y is available, then y when x is available, then agent A is not 
irrational—agent A is indifferent between x and y.  Hausman states that if agent A is 
indifferent between x and y, then it would take a series of trials before we figure out 
what the agent’s preferences are, which violates the WARP.214   
 The second objection deals with considering agents as “bearers of strategies.”  
In the language of game theory, economic agents are “players” which are found in 
“games.”  Thus, players make decisions in terms of the rules of game theory 
depending on preferences.  Players might do something other than their preference to 
mislead other players.215  Hausman example deals with the prisoner’s dilemma game.  
The prisoner’s dilemma is a game about two prisoners which are captured, then 
questioned in separate rooms.  If they both “cooperate,” meaning if they “tell” on the 
other prisoner, this is considered to be the best outcome because they will both get 
shorter sentences for cooperating.  The game theory “prediction” states that the 
players will always want to “not cooperate” and incriminate on the other player.  The 
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player who tells on the other player then gets none punishment whereas the other 
player gets all of it.  Hausman states that this game leads to “suboptimal outcomes.”  
The conclusion that game theorists draw from the prisoner’s dilemma is that prisoners 
do not cooperate (that is they stick to their story instead of turning themselves in), 
which is a worse outcome than if both cooperated (which is the case many times).  
Thus, Hausman argues, players’ preferences are misconstrued.  Hausman states that 
the analogy to be drawn from this game is about market failures.  If there is a market 
failure, then the rational thing to do is to cooperate.216 
 The third objection deals with completeness.  The completeness assumption 
deals with agent’s rankings—all of them.  That is, an economic agent is required to 
have a full rank of all the preferences available—and to be had (in the future)…as 
already stated, this complicates the already mentioned preference changes, and 
choices for objects which are not preferred. 
 Revealed-preference theory supposedly gets rid of the subjective economic 
agent.  Revealed-preference theory fails to rid itself of the subject because economic 
agents have desires, and these desires lead to choices.  The common thread among 
game theorists is to try to come up with a rational version of the individual linked to 
mathematical formulations.  But as we have seen, this is done at the expense of a 
coherent, more plausible account of the individual.   
 The last thing to say is that economic welfare is strictly linked to the construal 
of economic agents as either “bearers of strategies,” or economic agents as they are 
“revealed” by their choices.  
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 The next section deals with a different yet coherent theory of agents faced 
with choice in general.  Game Theory is highly mathematized, and this serves as the 
only way to justify the conclusions drawn in economic theory.217  Because there is 
much resistance in economics to moving away from mathematically intensive 
theories like game theory, our next task will be to show that other theories might be 
able to accommodate the problems that game theory as rational choice theory try to 
overcome by abstracting from agents, or by trying to axiomatize a system of choice. 
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6.  CHALLENGING NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS, VALUE & 
INTENTIONALITY, RECONSTRUCTING SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
 
One of the main attractions of game theory is its mathematical eloquence and 
rigor.  Game theorists claim to be able to analyze problems about economic agents 
formally through mathematics and derive conclusions about economic agents.  Game-
theorists seek to explain universal economic behavior.  The foundation of this 
“universal” economic behavior dates back to the principle of utility, as defined by 
Jeremy Bentham, and taken up unchanged by economists today (in its various forms); 
the principle of utility states that humans seek pleasure and avoid pain.  The language 
of game theory is that economic agents seek to maximize outcomes in economic 
situations.  This is the economic problem that each agent encounters.  The task of 
each economic agent maximizes utility to his/her end.218  In the history of economic 
thought, this maximization starts as quantitative, but because cardinal utility is 
internal to the economic agent, the problem is to figure out the whole of economic 
agents’ preferences.  If we try to figure out every economic agent’s preferences, 
assuming that we are able to do this, then we are faced with a problem figuring out 
whose preferences will be “the best.”  Ordinal utility theory replaces cardinal utility 
theory.  Ordinal utility theory relies on orderings of things.  Game theory makes 
substantial use of ordinality to claim that individuals will choose what they prefer, 
that their preferences are well defined, and consistent (see above, pg. 78), and finally, 
the choices made by economic agents are rational choices.  Rationality is strictly 
defined as optimization and maximization.  In thinking about economic agents, game 
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theorists neglect important aspects of individuals, social theory, and value.  This 
section will show that there are other relevant non-mathematical theories about 
economic agents, society, and intentions that give rise to choices.  Game theory as a 
theory of the individual, as a social theory, and as a theory of value is untenable. 
6.1 The Philosophy of Game Theory 
 
 Game theory seeks to explain the whole of human economic interactions.  It 
focuses on the economic agents’ choices.  These choices create a reality that can be 
analyzed through “games.”  The most famous example of a game is supposed to help 
us think about human behavior is the prisoner’s dilemma (see pg. 80 above).  The 
economic agent’s task is to maximize positive consequences, as in classical 
utilitarianism.219  The rise of game theory in the 1940’s with Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern sought to “repair” economic theory.  The “repair” was to be made by 
requiring “rigorous” strictly mathematical formulations.  These mathematical 
formulations, as (Mirowski 2002) argues, are simply elaborate formulations without 
the least bearing on economic reality.  Mirowski’s argument is that game-theorists 
seek to relate economics to a game of automata220—that is, a 
computerized/mechanized mode of economic decision.  Mirowski states that game-
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theorists seek to make economics a “cyborg” science-where a cyborg is an organism 
that is part machine—the connection to game theory is that game theory relies on 
mathematics to make statements about “human nature.”  Mirowski’s argument is 
similar to the argument in here—simply taking mathematics and mixing mathematics 
into economic theory does not render economic theory true.  In principle, economic 
theory should see to develop the integration of powerful computations methods 
backed by abstract mathematical statements.221  In doing so, one also much consider 
what it means to have such a coupling—the “rigorous mathematics” with the abstract 
mathematical statements.  In neoclassical economics, the coupling of mathematics to 
economic theory has become the standard way of theorizing.  Mathematics becomes 
the source of knowledge and sole apparatus by which justification about economic 
theories becomes possible (and true).  Mirowski insists that the only possible proper 
justification for game theory is for game theorists to be not only concerned with 
philosophical assertions within economic theory.  The game theorist, then should be 
concerned about history and philosophy of science (as a way to make sure tenable 
ontological views are succinctly analyzed).222    
 When considering economic agents, game theorists are only concerned about 
the preference structure of agents.  As we saw earlier, the preference structure of an 
economic agent refers to the types of things among which the economic agent makes 
choices.  The preference structure to which game theorists make reference is always 
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 87
tractable, and consistent.223  Once the theory is justified with eloquent mathematical 
formulations, it is then that game theorists are able to make concrete statements about 
the welfare of economic agents.  The economic welfare of agents (which is essentially 
all the welfare of agents) is characterized by the individual agent’s preference 
structure. 
 The seminal paper by Kenneth Arrow shows that collective decisions are not 
easily derivable.  Even if it is the case that agents have well ordered preferences, the 
whole of economic agents (society) is unable to come to a choice that is definitive.224  
Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows it is impossible to come to a situation where all 
preferences by all of the members of society are satisfied.  Game theory’s statement 
on welfare is then to assume that economic agents are accepting of choices that the 
whole of economic agents face.  Theoretically, if we accept game theory as an 
economic theory, we are granting the commensuration of all preferences—that is, we 
grant that our preferences are measurable, even if the measure is a set of orderings, 
the commensuration of all these preferences give rise to a question of value and 
preference.  Game theorists, alongside with consequentialists, are able to claim that 
through maximization, and the coherent structure of preferences, economic agents are 
able to come to a definitive statement about the maximization of economic welfare 
for the whole of economic agents.  What follows from Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
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is that only by a voting system can preferences be satisfied.  Arrow assumes a 
situation of “non-dictatorship” for the entire social system of preferences to work.  
This simply says that no single agent’s preferences influence the preferences of all 
other agents in the economy.  Thus, all the agents must be in agreement.  This is the 
best situation of economic welfare.  I.M.D. Little argues that even within a voting 
system, we are not guaranteed that the outcome be non-arbitrary.225 
 One further complication that arises about the impossibility of game theory 
(hinted at in section 5.1) is the constitution of the individual in game theory.  Even 
though it seems strange to connect economic agents to automated mathematical 
algorithms, this is essentially the aim of game theorists regarding the individual.226  
The task of game theory is to explain individuals and the complexity of interaction 
among those individuals, coupled with the multiplicity in the world, but ends up 
being a “bricolage of algorithms.”227  What game theory actually does is reduce 
human behavior to maximization of “value.”  This maximization is easily formulated 
mathematically.  This maximization is related to the rational choices by agents.  
These rational choices coincide with choosing a higher ‘value.’  Thus, it is irrational 
for an economic agent to choose a value that is less than another available ‘value.’  
This is the extent to which game theorists treat value.  It is instrumental to agents’ 
decisions, but it remains abstract, and unanalyzed.  The next section shows that 
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further analysis of value leads to severe complications for maximization and choices 
based on optimization and maximization of value.  
6.2 Value, Choice and Economics 
 What about value is so important to game theory, or even economics?  Game 
theory depends on value as a quantitative scale upon which all things are measured as 
preferences.  Value, in its most general sense, is far from constituting merely a 
quantitative scale.  Value is generally related to some question about “goodness” with 
regard to an object or some set of events as in classical utilitarianism.  The reason 
why value is important in a theoretical analysis in economics is that there are 
competing views on value which might affect what is said about economic agents (or 
ethical agents—whatever type of agents we speak about).  Value theory seeks to 
answer some basic questions about value.  First, the question of intrinsic value, 
something that has its “worth” based on its unique properties.  Those properties are 
independent of any other properties outside of the object in question.  Knowledge, for 
example, might be considered an intrinsic good.228  Questions arise on whether there 
is one intrinsic good, or many intrinsic good—this is the debate between monists and 
pluralists about value.  Jeremy Bentham, was a proponent of value monism.229  John 
Stuart Mill on the other hand was a proponent of value pluralism.  We have seen that 
both of these characters are important in the history of economic thought—both of 
them have impacted the neoclassical economics paradigm. 
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 Mark Schroeder explains that there at least three things that need to be 
accounted for in order to pursue any theory of value.  The first one is ontology of 
value.  Value pluralists argue that there are different types of values (knowledge and 
pleasure might be two distinct intrinsic values).  Value monists argue that there is one 
and only one value.230     
 Whether one argues for value pluralism, or value monism one will have to 
deal with the what Schroeder calls “revisionary commitments.”  Given that monism is 
true, how might we explain that there are seemingly different values at work when, 
for example we talk about varieties of goodness?231  A knife’s goodness is different 
than the goodness of friendship.  The monist might have to argue that the value 
displayed is no different in kind, but still remains the case how this non-difference in 
kind supervenes on two different cases of goodness.  Pluralists on the other hand, 
have a different problem in that they state that there are different values.  So they 
would no have a problem explaining why the knife is good vs. why friendship is 
good.  Their problem arises when pluralists might have to add to their list of “values.” 
 Thirdly, Schroeder talks about incommensurability as another obstacle for any 
theory of value to be enlightening.  Incommensurability deals with values that are in 
conflict with each other.  If monism is true, then incommensurability never happens.  
But, as Schroeder states, the fact that we live in a complex world, and the complexity 
of situations gives rise to doubts to how much monism holds.  If we are to take a 
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pluralist view about value, then there must be an explanation as to the status of 
conflicting values.232 
 Game theorists believe (and require) that things are measurable on a single 
quantitative scale.  This includes the versions of game theory that construe value in 
terms of cardinal or ordinal utility theory.  Cardinal utility theory states that tastes can 
be measured by actual numbers.  Ordinal utility theory states that tastes need not be 
measured by numbers necessarily, but by rankings—we then refer to the array of 
possibilities and naming through which these two types of utility theory as 
interchanged with “revealed preferences,” or with “rational choice.”  Game theorists 
attribute value (used extremely loosely without any philosophical connotations) 
merely to be represented by rankings, or numerically.  We never get an actual theory 
of value except by assumption that given that the choices made by economic agents 
give rise to something which “pleases” the agent—going back to different forms of 
utilitarianism.233   
 Recall the definition of value of Jeremy Bentham places man at the mercy of 
two sovereign masters: pleasure and pain.234  Bentham then provides a dichotomous, 
simple scale of value, that which is pleasurable is good, and that which is painful is 
bad.  The purpose of humans is to maximize pleasure—and this comes about 
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naturally since humans are already under the command of the two sovereign masters.  
This is simple construal of value which exists at the core of game theory.   
 If game theory is to have any credibility with respect to its value claims, it 
would need to take on the basic issues of comparability between at least two 
conflicting objects, bearers of value.  The task of the economic agent in game theory 
is prescribed and reduced to the “preferences” of the agent already by design.  We are 
told that agents choose among the best options available for them.  This is clearly a 
version of utilitarianism.  As argued in section 5.2 above, there is a clear evolution in 
the way the economic theory is presented by renaming old concepts—utility becomes 
preference, preference becomes “revealed preference.”   
 Elizabeth Anderson’s Value in Ethics and Economics gives a pragmatic 
account of value that will help us with our critique of game theory.  Anderson’s 
theory consists in an “expressive theory of value.”  People have favorable attitude 
towards what they deem valuable.  Value, for Anderson, is intrinsic, as well as 
extrinsic.  Extrinsic value deals with the character of something that is valued based 
on the characteristics of the object which depend on the person with the favorable 
attitude towards the object.  Intrinsic value is a bit more complicated to deal with.  
Intrinsic value is a type of value that is independent of the person’s attitude towards 
the object.235   
 Concrete examples of intrinsic value, according to Anderson, are people, 
animals, and communities.  These, she states, we immediately care about and they are 
ends for which our actions are guided.  Our attitude towards them is immediately 
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known to be favorable.  This makes people, animals, and communities intrinsic 
goods.  We value intrinsic goods in themselves.  What is intrinsically value is the 
object of rational favorable attitude.236  Extrinsic goods are primarily means, and are 
tied primarily with states of affairs.  As stated earlier, extrinsic value is dependent on 
some agent’s attitude towards it. 237  States of affairs involve what are called 
instrumental goods, that is, these goods are supporting the ultimate end for which all 
action is being done.  This distinction is important because states of affairs could be 
construed as intrinsic values.  But it is easy to see that a view like this needs to 
collapse the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic value.      
 Elizabeth Anderson takes on versions of consequentialism, a variant of 
utilitarianism which states that people ought to do what brings about the best 
consequences for each individual.  The best version of consequentialism, according to 
Anderson, depends on the use of extrinsic value as the main form of value.  That is, 
the consequentialist view states that agents maximize a state of affairs that is 
[intrinsically] valuable for agents, thus, agents act in ways to bring about this state of 
affairs.238 Under this framework, agents are also able to take into account the value of 
people, though only instrumentally.239 
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 A more general description of consequentialism is as follows:  1) agents 
maximize intrinsic value, 2) intrinsic value is ascribed to a state of affairs, whereby 
the value is independent of peoples desires, intentions, actions, motives, 3) all these 
actions, intentions, motives are solely evaluated in terms of their consequences—how 
these consequences “embody the best states of affairs,” 4) all values are agent-
neutral—that is, if it gives everybody a reason to value it.240  In game theory, as 
previously discussed, the goal of individuals is to maximize value—the form in which 
takes place varies in terminology.   
 Consequentialist theories justify action merely by showing that agents ought 
to do any action maximizes value.241  Elizabeth Anderson looks at her own expressive 
theory of rationality to contrast actions under consequentialism vs. expressive theory 
of value.  Under consequentialism, there is no direction to the intentions of the agent, 
except to maximize value via consequences.  If we are evaluating the maximization of 
value, then the only thing that matters as an evaluative criterion is the consequence of 
the action and how well it relates to the best possible states of affairs.  Thus, the 
agent’s intentions about their actions are not directly linked—and are not a problem 
generally.  Anderson’s expressive theory of value states that agents have “rational 
favorable attitudes” towards intrinsic values.  These attitudes translate into action, but 
the action is guided by ends.  Under consequentialism, the agents are guided by 
consequences, which are intentionally or unintentionally maximizing welfare.  
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Consequentialism requires that agents have one aim and one aim only: the production 
of consequences.242  Consequentialist theories in general make intrinsic value 
immediately normative for desire, preference, choice, rules or action.  This means that 
given a set of intrinsic values, agents are immediately drawn to initiate consequences 
that will bring about the maximization of intrinsic values tied preferences, desires, 
action, or rules all of which are derived from norms.243  An important distinction 
between achieving consequences and intending ends (Anderson’s theory) lies in the 
fact that those agents that maximize consequences will have not way to control the 
consequences.  The consequences are either intended or unintended, for 
consequentialists, this will have no importance.  Anderson’s point is that when we try 
to evaluate an agent’s intentions about a particular end, we will be in at odd 
determining what actually the agent’s intentions were.  Furthermore, if we are to 
maximize consequences only, it is not guaranteed that the consequences will always 
be the best state of affairs possible.  Anderson argues primarily against this type of 
theorizing because of the lack of scrutiny of agent’s intentions.  Consequentialist 
theories are committed to having even the unintended actions which are actually bad, 
to coincide with the agent’s “intention for the best consequences.” 
 To give a clearer example borrowed from (Reshotko 2006), when we see an 
action, it is possible to trace what the ultimate intention of agents.  For Reshotko, 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet illustrates that all desire is for the “actual good.”244  
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In the case of Romeo, we see that he desires to be with Juliet.  Given that he thinks 
that Juliet is dead, Romeo decides to drink the poison thinking that Juliet is dead.  As 
the audience, we see that Romeo does not wish to drink the poison while Juliet is 
dead, thus he only drinks the poison thinking that Juliet is dead, therefore, Romeo 
only does what seems best, and not actually what is best.  In retrospect, Reshotko 
argues that theories which ignore or omit desire commit themselves to stating that 
agents desire what seems best, and not actually what is best.  In the case of 
consequentialist theories, cases like these are problematic because the best 
explanation we are able to give regarding human motivation is that we intended what 
is best without any mechanism with which to retrospectively analyze agents’ 
intentions.245  Anderson and Reshotko concur in investigating agents’ intentionality to 
steer away from any abstract version of intentionality.  Reshotko and Anderson agree 
that an agent’s intentions must be accounted for with every action and choice that an 
agent takes.  Urquhart (2005) further states that the point of having agents have real 
subjective tastes, preferences, and choices is part of being an individual, and no 
longer merely an atomic agent.246 
 Consequentialism’s “advantage” over other theories, according to Anderson is 
its acontextuality—consequentialists can state that their “maximizing of value can 
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take place in any context independent of history, thus acontextuality is ahistoricality.  
It is in this form that consequentialists are able to state their claims about 
maximization of value.  The main problems, as stated by Anderson include:  
that [practical] reason can settle all questions about what to choose; that it 
requires the global maximization of value; and that the grounds for rational 
choice  must be fully and decisively articulable, leaving no room for judgment 
and hence none for dispute.247 
 
The first sentence states that everything is measurable under one scale, meaning, there 
are no instances of incommensurability.  The second statement states that not only 
everything is measurable under one scale, this is the only scale of measurement—that 
is, it is a monistic theory of value.  Consequentialists and game theorists248 would 
dismiss Moore’s non-natural monism as unattractive because it is overtly 
metaphysical.   Another option for game theorists is to side with classical hedonists 
who take value to be reducible to pleasures—pleasures could also be construed as 
mental states where the levels of endorphin are measured, thus, the more endorphins, 
the more pleasure is experienced by the agent. 249  Reducing value to a mental state is 
a radical statement.  It single handedly reduces all activity as being directed by 
pleasure—as the ultimate end.  If all human intentionality is reducible to acts for the 
maximization of pleasure, then acts which cause pain, but which are only means to 
other ends, like running a marathon, are unexplainable, in this view. 
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 While global maximization of value is untenable, Anderson states that it is 
still possible to defend a pragmatic theory of comparable value.  A pragmatic theory 
of value deals with trying to commensurate things in terms of extrinsic value, and 
without assuming that agents maximize value globally.  What ultimately must be 
claimed under this pragmatic theory of value is the need for a universal measure, only 
an objective standard which deals with comparing value.  Some offer “brute 
preferences” as the justification of having universal scales which are objective.250  
Others justify the need to choose between two goods like money and life, “preferably 
in terms of money.”251  The seeming “advantage” of having such theory would 
eliminate the problems of incommensurability generally.252   
 The extent to which the comparative theory of value can be used is for athletic 
activities, which require “goodness-of-a-kind” judgments.  Goodness-of-a-kind 
judgments are statements about of value of a certain activity, a triathlon.  The 
properties of the athlete’s performance are judged objectively by the set of rules that 
exist to do so.  Because there are a myriad of athletic activities, Anderson states that 
the comparative theory of value necessitates a plural interpretation of value.  That is, 
a theory of value that does not reduce value to a specific thing, such as pleasure, or an 
action or a consequence.253  The second outcome of a comparative theory of value is 
that we are able to make sense of personal judgments of what option is best.  Personal 
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judgments about what is best are construed with a “multi-criterion evaluation” from 
impersonal goodness-of-a-kind judgments.  These personal judgments constitute, but 
are not limited to athletic activities, but also incommensurable goods, or goods that 
cannot be deemed to be better than the other when compared.254 
 Elizabeth Anderson pragmatic theory of value does not go far enough in 
dealing with the problems at hand with value.  She does start with a distinction of 
intrinsic vs. extrinsic form of value.  She allows for incommensurability but, once 
again, her critique of consequentialism only goes so far.  Anderson only asserts that 
when we have incommensurability, the objects in question might be in a sense 
“equal” to each other.  But this “equality” is not able to tell us whether one choice 
was warranted whereas other choice might have not been.  Elizabeth Anderson’s 
objections to rational choice theorists do not go far enough for either rational choice 
theorists, or consequentialists to be worried.  If we are to have a theory of value and 
choice, with regard to that value, what else to we have to account for? 
 Ruth Chang posits the problem in a different way very close to the problem of 
incommensurability.  Incommensurability, as we have already said with a situation in 
which to objects are in conflict with respect to value.  For Chang, incommensurability 
does not entail incomparability.  In fact, Chang states that there is no 
“incomparability” generally.255  That is, even if two objects aren’t comparable in the 
traditional sense of “worse than,” “equal,” and “better than,” those objects might still 
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have a value relation.  Chang is extremely helpful in understanding that our critique 
of value in game theory needs to go further than just objecting that game theory only 
posits the maximization of value.  Justification of choice, according to Chang, is 
ultimately what needs to occur in order for us to judge if our choices are “sound.”  
Even in simple cases such as choosing between coffee and tea, Chang states, we 
might have difficulty relating our individual tastes for either coffee, or tea.  This 
difficulty arises if we begin comparing a hot cup of tea with the hot cup of coffee.  
Chang state that, initially, the hot tea and the hot coffee are incomparable.  One might 
go around in circles citing the texture of either, the taste of either, the quality of either 
in order to make a choice.256  What ends up happening, according to Chang, is that 
when faced with such choices, agents start to deliberate about the qualities of each 
objects until those qualities are “justify” the choice of coffee over tea, or vice-versa.  
Chang’s example is that the cup of hot tea that initially was there might now be just 
warm tea.  How does warm tea compare to a hot cup of coffee.  The process making 
either coffee or tea less attractive is called a “merit pump.”  That is, the initial 
characteristics of the cup of tea are devalued such that we make it less attractive to 
choose coffee over tea (or vice versa).  Chang states that the “merit pump” problem 
calls for justification of choice; obviously this justification of choice cannot be ad-
hoc.257   
 Chang cites seven main arguments for incomparability (of which we will only 
cover 4).  The first type are arguments from the diversity of value—that is given that 
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we have a multiplicity of values, when two of those values come in conflict, then we 
have a situation of incomparability.  A fatal objection to these types of arguments 
deals with stating what Chang calls ‘nominally notable’ comparisons.  When we 
compare Michelangelo and Mozart, it is true that there is no way to compare these 
two with respect to creativity.  But when we have a third object of comparison—
“Talentlessi,” it is clear that talentlessi is less talented with respect to creativity to 
both Michelangelo and Mozart.  If we have continuum of these less talented painters, 
Chang states, then we can compare Mozart to these less talented painters.258 
 The second type of argument for incomparability is the argument from 
calculation.  These types of arguments state that value is construed quantitatively, or 
qualitatively.  Value is assigned a type of scale dealing with magnitudes of some sort.  
Value judgments depend on “adding” or “subtracting” value from an object.  
Arguments from calculation assume that deliberation about values requires a type of 
calculation.  Then, the objection raised against calculations of value simply asserts 
that the whole of value relations among objects cannot rest merely on calculation, 
therefore we have incomparability.259  According to Chang, the fact that value 
judgments are required to be calculative is misinterpreting, and reducing the structure 
of value.  The language of calculation is prevalent especially with consequentialist 
theories.  The obvious objection is that value judgments need not be formulated with 
calculation in mind.  That is, there are other value relations among objects besides 
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more, less, or equal than—deliberation is “calculative in form.”  There might be 
situations where there is vagueness with respect to what type of value comparison 
might be made.260  Another type of comparison that might be made with respect to 
two objects is a “nameless value” relation.  If we take the case of comparing giving 
money to a charity or putting that same money in a retirement account, one has moral 
merits whereas the other one has practical merits.  When we try to analyze the value 
relation among these two things we see that even though were will have to make a 
choice, we have will have not way to assign the type of value upon which we are 
calling for the comparison—this is a nameless value.261  Arguments from calculation, 
then assume that deliberation about value is merely calculative, and because this 
calculation is not possible in some cases, there is incomparability.    
 Arguments from multiple rankings state that there is incomparability when 
there is conflict with respect to comparisons that deal with several components.  
Chang’s example deals with hiring a philosophy professor.  The candidates are 
Eunice and Janice.  The evaluation for the job will be decided on the candidates’ 
ability on clarity, creativeness, and competence.  Eunice is a clearer writer than 
Janice, but Janice is slightly more competent writer.  If we take these characteristics, 
and rearrange the importance, then we have a conflict between the different ways 
among which the selection of the candidates could be made.  Given that we have this 
conflict of rankings, this type of argument state that we have incomparability.  Chang 
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posits a possibility, where we might have Eunice*, who might be slightly better than 
Eunice by being clearer.  Or we might have Eunice+ who is slightly more competent 
than Eunice.  Yet, it cannot be said that either Eunice* or Eunice+ is better overall 
than Janice.  Thus, there might be a continuum of possibilities to construe Eunice that 
might render the situation comparable.262 
 Lastly, arguments from small improvements, according to Chang, are the most 
powerful types of arguments with respect to trying to demonstrate incomparability.  
These arguments state that given two objects, say (Chang’s example taken from 
Joseph Raz) a career as a clarinetist and a career as a lawyer; take either career and 
improve it by an amount of money; if we improve the clarinetist career by $10, this 
makes the career better than the previous version of the clarinetist career, yet we 
cannot say that the improved career as a clarinetist is better than the career as a 
lawyer, therefore we have incomparability.263  The general form of the argument is 
the following:  (1) If A is neither better nor worse than B, (2) A+ is better than A, (3) 
A+ is not better than B, then (4) A and B are incomparable.  The main force of the 
argument, states Chang, is between 1 and 3.  Even though we might judge that a 
series of clarinetists might be better than our initial clarinetist A, it still does not 
follow that the series of clarinetists that are better than A are just incomparable to the 
career as a lawyer.264  The reason why this argument is powerful relies on what 
Chang call the trichotomy thesis—that is, the relation of value among objects or 
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things is captured by “better than,” “equal,” or “worse than.”265  Problems arise when 
we have a relation that might be outside of these three value relations.  Chang argues 
that there is a fourth relation with respect to value judgments that allows us to 
incorporate seeming incommensurability.   
 The fourth relation with which we might compare two things is parity.  In 
“The Possibility of Parity” and “Parity, Interval Value, and Choice,” argues that 
because of the complexity of value judgments and situations that call upon us to 
deliberate on value, acceptance of the trichotomy thesis is not enough to capture cases 
in which no direct comparison can be made.  Such cases include the vagueness of 
value with respect to two or more objects being compared.266  If we take the examples 
that we have been using thus far, coffee vs. tea, Michelangelo vs. Mozart with respect 
to creativity, the hiring of Eunice vs. Janice for a professorship—it should be clear 
that although these cases are hard, we are better off declaring that these are good 
cases for parity.  If we take the tools of rational choice theory, or adhere to the 
trichotomy thesis of value relations, we are pushed to admit that these cases are cases 
of incomparable.  It is arguably the case that we are on safer ground stating that these 
cases are cases of parity.  Parity allows us to have the most complex situations of 
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comparison without having to resort to admitting incomparability or merely asserting 
parity.  If we take the model of consequentialism, or the model of game theory, vs. 
Chang’s model, we see that Chang’s model captures every possible case, theoretically 
or in real life.      
 The last caveat for talking about value relations is about incomparability vs. 
non-comparability.  Incomparability is a substantive claim with respect to the 
composition of value of a certain object.  Chang’s example for non-comparability is 
“gustatory pleasure” with respect to chalk.  When we compare the taste of chalk to 
the taste of food, we don’t have a case of incomparability, but non-comparability.  
Non-comparability relates to the absence of “covering-value.”  The covering value for 
food is “gustatory pleasure.”  But even in cases where we might not have a named 
covering value, we will have to make comparisons and choices.  This seemingly 
trivial caveat is important because even in cases of non-comparability, since no 
relation can be established, we will end up in the territory of vagueness one way or 
another, and as we have argued, judgments about vagueness with respect to value are 
better understood by using parity as Chang has suggested.    
 Up until this point, we haven’t talked about the consequences for 
maximization of value (or even optimization).  Given that we have hard cases of 
comparison, where we might declare that the relation of comparison is parity, how are 
we to maximize, or even optimize?  This puts heavy doubts on the game theoretical 
project of “agent rationality” and maximization of value.  Hsieh (2007) argues that we 
might not have to give up maximization that easily as a result of Chang’s argument 
for parity.  Hsieh observes that Chang’s analysis requires rejecting the axiom of 
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transitivity.267  Hsieh states that this rejection is to high a cost to pay.268  Hsieh’s view 
states that     
Optimization requires the choice of an alternative that is at least as good as 
other alternatives and rules out the possibility of justified choice between 
incomparable alternatives. In contrast, maximization only requires the choice 
of an alternative that is not worse than other alternatives. Because 
incomparable alternatives qualify as not worse than one another, 
maximization allows for justified choice between them269 
 
Hsieh argues that when comparing to options, we need not incur the cost of rejecting 
the axiom of transitivity.  Hsieh think that maximization is a viable option even in 
hard cases.270  Although Hsieh is in disagreement with Chang about the 
maximization, in cases of vagueness, it is hard to see how the axiom of transitivity 
cannot be rejected.  Take any of the cases.  This is an obvious objection to Hsieh 
(2007).  This is surprising because Hsieh refers to John Broome (on vagueness).  
According to Hsieh, choosing a less paying musical career (taken from Chang), might 
make sense, and yet, we might have a case for maximization.  But the whole point of 
calling upon parity for such cases is that there can be an array of formulations that for 
which we must account.  If we take our musical career we might argue that there are 
several configurations about the musical career that are on a par.  If we take one 
aspect of the musical career, say a continuum of pay, it is clear that as Hsieh state, we 
will be able to decipher those that are “not worse,” therefore, maximization holds 
there.  But when we have aspects of talent, creativity and the like, adding continua 
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with respect to these will make it a lot harder for “maximization” to hold without 
invoking parity. 
 This section dealt with the justification of choice with respect to value.  It is 
clear that an array of choices among seemingly incomparable things present a 
problem for the “agent rationality” of game theory.  Elizabeth Anderson’s critique 
only brought us so far against this “agent rationality” and maximization of value.  
Hsieh (2007) provided a way that we might construe “maximization” without 
referring to parity in order to justify choice.  The conclusion to be drawn is that if we 
are able to account of all possible cases of comparison, we are left with 
incommensurability and vagueness if we accept the project advanced by classical 
utilitarianism, game theory, and neoclassical economics.    
6.3 Intersubjectivity in Economics, Structures and Agents 
  
 Over the course of this paper, we have seen that that the main attraction of 
neoclassical theory has been its simplicity, and seeming coherence.  This simplicity 
has allowed for interesting, yet radical statements about human interactions, and 
intentions.  Neoclassical economic theory presents to us the atomic individual.  This 
atomic individual’s sole purpose is to maximize utility, in whatever formulation, or 
context in economic theory.  Reality is radically different from mere atomic 
individuals acting in isolation.  Neoclassical theory does not account for the fact that 
individuals do interact.  Instead of having a harmonious whole, as is the case in 
neoclassical economic theory, we have a complex, interacting, and dynamic whole 
about which much more needs to be learned. 
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 When it comes to individual agents, (Davis 2002) proposes that agents are 
embedded in the complex social whole.  Agent’s choices, intentions, and interactions 
depend on a social structure that predates any type of completely independent, atomic 
individual.  The social structure, in turn, is affected by the decisions individuals 
make—thus, there is a reciprocal dynamic relationship between individuals and 
society.271  Davis states that individuals are able to have “we-intentions” which are 
the foundation of reciprocal behavior of economic agents.272  (Fehr and Falk 2002) 
further Davis’ view by stating that atomic individuals that act on their own behalf, as 
maximizers of value, do not thrive in a competitive environment.  Rather, reciprocal 
fairness places a halt to neoclassical theory and its claim of only self-interested 
individual maximizing value.273 
 In “Flaws in the Foundation, Consumer Behavior and General Equilibrium 
Theory,” Frank Ackerman critiques what lies at the core of neoclassical theory 
(which also applies to game theoretical formulations).  Agents are asocial, they have 
insatiable or unlimited wants, and consumer choices are informed by well-ordered, 
well-informed desires about the commodities in general.  All three assumptions are 
easily refuted by: intersubjectivity—people are complex individuals hardly reducible 
to atomic agents; advertising and group peer pressure, consumption patterns are 
affected by these in non-trivial ways; and finally, when people consume, they stop 
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after the particular wants or needs are satisfied.  Consumers don’t consume all the 
food until the fridge is empty.274  In terms of general equilibrium theory (briefly 
discussed above), neoclassical theory states that economies tend to equilibrium via 
the competitiveness of economic agents.  This competitiveness allows for a market 
clearing situation where prices and quantities produced in the economy are 
determined.275  Furthermore, this equilibrium situation is stable.  The reality is 
different from this.  As Ackerman states, there are two complications in economic 
theory which do not permit economic stability such as posited in neoclassical theory: 
“one involves aggregation, and the other concerns the behavioral model of the 
individual.  Both are causes of instability of general equilibrium.”276  Ackerman 
suggests repairing the flaws at the foundation of neoclassical economic theory.  What 
this amounts to changing the three assumptions that arise in consumer theory which 
plague the whole of neoclassical theory:   
  
While it [the new theory] might still involve some mathematical analysis, the 
variables would be different, representing human needs, desires, and 
experiences rather than commodities.  Abstract proof of optimality of any 
particular market outcome would be unlikely.  Instead, evaluation of 
economic systems would involve history, politics, and recognition of the 
intersubjective nature of human behavior.  It would involve ethical judgments 
about what our society has achieved, and what else it could have done.  […] in 
short, many contemporary economists would conclude that such a theory was 
not really economics.277 
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(Pfouts 2002) suggests that neoclassical consumer theory, which lies at the foundation 
of current mainstream economic analysis be discarded for a new “ontology [that] can 
always be stated in epistemological terms.”278   
 The word ontology refers to the study of existence and to the study of the 
being of beings.  In the context of economics, ontology refers to how economic 
agents behave, and how institutions might affect that agent behavior.279  The purpose 
of having an explicit ontology regulates the way in which statements about beings are 
made.  Having an explicit ontology of the consumer, according to Pfouts, “dissolves 
the mystery” of statements about beings about which the theory speaks.280  Pfouts 
concludes:   
Too often economic theorists have not adopted logical methods appropriate 
for investigating the economic world, but instead have assumed an imaginary 
economic world that submits to the logical methods they want to use.  They 
have preferred to abandon the world in favor of their preferences in 
mathematics rather than using mathematical and other methods that are 
effective in analyzing the real world.281 
 
Herein lays the core of this whole discussion.  Neoclassical methodology in whatever 
form, makes radical claims that go against the common occurrences of the “real 
world.”  That is not to say that their theory is entirely untrue.  The lack of 
consideration of ontology (among others) makes mainstream economic theory suspect 
as a theory that pertains to the “real world.”  As it is stated by Pfouts, mathematical 
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rigor is not a substitute for ontology.  Arguably, mathematicians have their own 
issues dealing with the ontology of mathematics on their own.  Adding persons to the 
picture, not only makes the problem of ontology more complicated—the problem 
necessitates philosophical considerations beyond the use of mathematics to justify 
economic statements. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 Throughout the whole of this discussion, we saw that mathematics is used as 
the main source of justification for mainstream economic theory.  Mathematics is 
supposed to provide a secure foundation for economists, but as we saw in sections 2 
and 3, mathematics is inherently metaphysical.  The type of metaphysical system will 
affect the types of statements that economists/scientists will be able to make in 
articulating their theories; in economics, the way in which we construe the individual 
and the economy will drive the research and the results derived from that research.  
Stating clearly the metaphysical system, in whatever context, allows to clarify and to 
anticipate problems that lie at the foundation of economic, as well as other forms of 
analysis.  Without such considerations, we are left in hands of obscure, drastically 
simplified metaphysical claims.  The neoclassical theory of the individual, as well as 
general equilibrium are examples of neoclassical economic theory where neoclassical 
economists, in trying to escape metaphysics, adhere to outdated and improbable 
metaphysical statements about the individual and the economy as a whole.  If one is 
to escape metaphysics, one has to realize that one is already using metaphysical 
statements the moment mathematics and mathematical economics are invoked. 
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